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I. INTRODUCTION 
Medical device sales representatives play a unique role in the 
delivery of treatment to the patient as compared to pharmaceutical 
sales representatives.  Medical device representatives are often in 
the operating room or present during the patient visit and can 
provide pretreatment technical information about the device.  
While this unique role can provide great benefit to the 
manufacturer, the physician, and the patient, it can also expose a 
manufacturer and the sales representative to liability.  Once limited 
to basic tort claims, such as negligence for failure to warn or 
invasion of privacy, the avenues for sales representative liability 
have blossomed over the last few years.  Counsel for a medical 
device manufacturer (both in-house and outside counsel) must 
2
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become familiar with a broader range of claims.  This article gives 
readers an overview of the expanded theories of liability for 
medical device representative conduct with an emphasis on recent 
and novel claims, as well as successful defenses to these claims.  In 
order to aid counsel in better understanding the nuances and 
challenges presented in defending these new claims involving sales 
representatives, this article uses specific case examples drawn from 
recent experience. 
There are two primary reasons for the increase in claims 
involving medical device sales representatives.  First, as is widely 
recognized, the U.S. government has increased its enforcement 
actions against the healthcare industry, including medical device 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers.  More recently, the 
government has focused on the prosecution of individuals under 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  Sales managers and 
directors have been included as targets in these governmental-
enforcement actions.  This increase in government actions against 
medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers with a focus on 
responsible corporate officers has given rise to a similar increase in 
civil products liability actions based on the government actions.  
This article explores the government’s recent use of the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine as applied in pharmaceutical 
and medical device prosecutions and explores several recent 
examples where medical device sales managers or directors were 
prosecuted by the U.S. government with mixed results.1  This 
article also discusses recent products liability cases based on 
government-enforcement actions involving allegations related to 
sales representatives.2  Finally, this article addresses evidentiary 
issues in products liability cases where there is a parallel 
government prosecution.3 
The second primary reason for the increase in claims involving 
medical device sales representatives is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,4 in which the Court held 
that the Medical Device Amendments precluded state law tort 
claims challenging the design, manufacture, or labeling of Class III 
medical devices approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) via the premarket approval process.  Since the Riegel 
 
 1.  See infra Part II.B. 
 2.  See infra Part II.C. 
 3.  See infra Part III.D. 
 4.  552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
3
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decision, plaintiffs have attempted to assert novel claims to avoid 
preemption by focusing on the alleged conduct of sales 
representatives.  This article discusses the application of the Riegel 
decision to allegations involving medical device sales 
representatives.5  This article also examines novel negligence 
allegations involving sales representative conduct asserted in an 
attempt to avoid preemption under Riegel.6  Included in this 
discussion is a brief overview of the implications of state laws 
regarding the unauthorized practice of medicine and their relation 
to negligence claims involving medical device sales representatives. 
As a defense strategy, medical device manufacturers often seek 
to remove cases to federal court based on federal diversity 
jurisdiction.  However, the naming of a typically in-state sales 
representative as an individual defendant in an attempt to avoid 
Riegel preemption serves the dual purpose of potentially defeating 
diversity jurisdiction for the out-of-state manufacturer.  In those 
cases, defendants may argue that the sales representative was 
fraudulently joined.  Interestingly, if the sales representative is 
considered a “seller” or “distributor” under state products liability 
law, the sales representative could be held strictly liable for device 
defects, such that the sales representative would not be fraudulently 
joined and there would be no federal diversity jurisdiction.  This 
article explores the application of various state products liability 
statutes as applied to sales representatives in the fraudulent joinder 
context.7 
Finally, this article tackles recently asserted defenses to 
allegations involving sales representative conduct as well as ultimate 
case outcomes.8  Case studies provide specific examples of the most 
prevalently asserted and successful defenses to claims involving 
sales representative conduct.  This article analyzes the new ways 
that classic defenses are currently being used, including application 
of the learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty, captain of 
the ship doctrine, and lack of causation.9  In particular, this article 
addresses the application of these defenses in recent trials involving 
sales representative conduct. 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009); see infra Part III.A–B. 
 6.  See infra Part III.C. 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See infra Part V. 
 9.  Id. 
4
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II. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST MEDICAL 
DEVICE SALES MANAGERS AND DIRECTORS 
The increase in government prosecution of individual officers 
of pharmaceutical and medical device companies, including sales 
managers and directors, is one factor that is leading to an increase 
in sales representative products liability cases.  The government has 
based its prosecution of these individuals on the responsible 
corporate officer doctrine.10  While the doctrine is generally 
utilized in the prosecution of corporate executive officers and 
other high ranking officials, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
expanded its enforcement of the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine to other corporate officers and employees, including sales 
managers, directors, and even sales representatives.  Courts have 
generally approved this extension of the responsible corporate 
officer doctrine, and hefty fines and even prison sentences have 
been levied on these corporate officers.11  Although the recent 
landmark Second Circuit decision, United States v. Caronia, 
reversing the conviction of a sales representative for off-label 
promotion, may mark a shift in prosecutorial policy in the future.12 
Direct prosecution of medical device sales representatives is 
still relatively rare; however, the filing of civil products liability 
claims against medical device sales representatives based, at least in 
part, on government enforcement actions has continued to grow.  
Medical device products liability lawsuits involving sales 
representatives can be based on government action as simple as an 
FDA warning letter13 or as complex as a government prosecution of 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(involving the prosecution of a pharmaceutical company senior corporate officer 
convicted under the responsible corporate officer doctrine); United States v. 
Huggins, No. 09-403-3, 2011 WL 6180623, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011) 
(referencing the guilty plea of medical device corporate officer under the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine); United States v. Higgins, No. 09-403-4, 
2011 WL 6088576, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2011) (same); Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. 
Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1097 (Del. Ch. 2012) (referencing pharmaceutical corporate 
officer’s guilty plea under the responsible corporate officer doctrine).  
 11.  See infra Part II.B. 
 12.  703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13.  An FDA warning letter is a communication sent by the FDA to the 
product manufacturer notifying the manufacturer that there has been a violation 
of FDA regulations.  The warning letter identifies the violation and provides 
guidance on how the company must correct the issue.  See Inspections, Compliance, 
Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda 
.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm278624.htm (last updated 
Dec. 8, 2011). 
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the sales managers or directors.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys use these 
government enforcement actions as ammunition against both the 
medical device company itself, as well as the sales representatives.  
Products liability actions that involve medical device companies 
subject to governmental action often raise challenging evidentiary 
issues at trial.  Plaintiffs hope to introduce evidence of corporate 
wrongdoing through evidence of other bad acts, including 
previously executed corporate integrity agreements and consent 
decrees.14  Defendants have challenged the admission of this 
evidence with mixed results. 
A. Responsible Corporate Officer Liability Under the Park Doctrine 
The government’s health care fraud prevention and 
enforcement efforts set a new record in fiscal year 2011 with the 
largest sum ever recovered in a single year.15  This statistic reflects 
criminal and civil investigation and enforcement efforts by various 
governmental entities on both the federal and state levels, 
including, but not limited to, Offices of the State Attorneys 
General, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the U.S. Department of Justice, 
the Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Congress, the FDA, and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.16  Recently, the focus has shifted 
 
 14.  Corporate integrity agreements are agreements between the Office of 
Inspector General for the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (OIG) and health care providers and other entities “as part of the 
settlement of Federal health care program investigations arising under a variety of 
civil false claims statutes.  Providers or entities agree to the obligations, and in 
exchange, OIG agrees not to seek their exclusion from participation in Medicare, 
Medicaid, or other Federal health care programs.”  Corporate Integrity Agreements, 
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://oig.hhs 
.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 
2013).  Consent decrees are agreements that all parties agree to, which settle the 
claims alleged against the individual or company where the individual or company 
agrees to take specific actions without admitting fault or guilt.  Consent decrees 
have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.  Some issues are resolved by 
consent of the parties (as in a contract) and some issues require judicial acts 
rendered by the judge (as in judicial decrees). 
 15.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Health Care Fraud Prevention and 
Enforcement Efforts Result in Record-Breaking Recoveries Totaling Nearly $4.1 
Billion (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February 
/12-ag-213.html. 
 16.  In addition, during fiscal year 2011, task forces such as the Health Care 
Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team, created to prevent fraud, waste, 
and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and various Medicare Fraud 
Strike Force Teams expanded local partnerships to prevent fraud.  See id. 
6
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from the prosecution of companies to targeting individual 
executives, including sales executives.17 
Governmental legal authority for criminal and civil 
investigations of pharmaceutical and medical device companies is 
derived from several separate statutes and regulations.18  
Prosecutions are generally based on provisions and regulations of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).19  The concept of the 
responsible corporate officer (RCO) originated with the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Dotterweich.20  In 
Dotterweich, the president of a pharmaceutical company was 
convicted of a misdemeanor for shipping adulterated and 
misbranded drugs in interstate commerce.21  The Supreme Court 
found in Dotterweich that a corporate official could be convicted of a 
misdemeanor under the FDCA if he or she had a “responsible 
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute 
outlaws, namely, to put into the stream of interstate commerce 
adulterated or misbranded drugs.”22 
The potential for RCO liability further developed in the 
Supreme Court decision United States v. Park.23  In Park, Acme 
Markets President, John Park, was informed by the FDA of poor 
conditions in his company’s warehouses in Philadelphia and 
Baltimore, but the problems persisted.24  The government 
prosecuted Acme and Park for misdemeanor violations of food 
adulteration.25  Park was convicted and was fined $250.26  His 
conviction was reversed by the appellate court, but the Supreme 
 
 17.  See Laurence Freedman, Three Guilty Pleas Under Responsible Corporate 
Officer Doctrine Signal Heightened Enforcement, RX COMPLIANCE REP., Aug. 6, 2009, at 
10; see, e.g., cases cited supra note 10; see also Michael J. Vanselow & Ann M. 
Bildtsen, 2009—Healthcare Law Enforcement “Perfect Storm,” HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2010, 
at 18, 22. 
 18.  See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333 
(2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing authority for government indictments, including 
the unlawful marketing of medical devices, fraud on the FDA, and the distribution 
of adulterated products); False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006) 
(providing authority for civil action for false or fraudulent claims for payment and 
other similar acts).  States also have their own False Claims Act statutes and 
consumer protection laws. 
 19.  21 U.S.C. §§ 331–350e. 
 20.  320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 21.  Id. at 278. 
 22.  Id. at 284. 
 23.  421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 24.  Id. at 661–62. 
 25.  Id. at 660, 682–83. 
 26.  See id. at 666. 
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Court reversed the appellate court and ordered Park’s conviction 
be reinstated.27  The Supreme Court found in Park that the focus of 
RCO liability lies not in where a corporate defendant’s position is 
within the corporate hierarchy, but rather if the corporate 
“defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, 
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, 
or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he 
failed to do so.”28 
The “Park doctrine,” as it has evolved and is in use today, 
provides that a responsible corporate official can be held liable for 
a first-time misdemeanor and a possible subsequent felony based 
on a violation of the FDCA, without proof that the corporate 
official acted with knowledge, intent, negligence, or even 
participation in the specific offense.29  The prosecution of a 
responsible corporate official for a misdemeanor violation of the 
FDCA, a “Park Doctrine prosecution,” is handled by the DOJ.30  The 
FDA has found that a Park doctrine prosecution has a strong 
deterrent effect on pharmaceutical and medical device companies 
and other regulated entities.31 
In 2011, the FDA released a set of nonbinding criteria to be 
used to evaluate RCO liability in connection with the Park doctrine, 
referred to as the “Park Doctrine Criteria.”32  When considering 
whether to recommend a misdemeanor prosecution against a 
corporate official, the FDA will consider “the individual’s position 
in the company and relationship to the violation, and whether the 
official had the authority to correct or prevent the violation.”33  
Further, the FDA does not find knowledge of and actual 
participation in the violation to be prerequisites, but does consider 
them factors that may be relevant when deciding whether to 
recommend charging a misdemeanor violation.34  Other factors the 
FDA will consider in determining whether to recommend a 
misdemeanor prosecution against a corporate official include but 
 
 27.  Id. at 666, 678. 
 28.  Id. at 673–74. 
 29.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-3, at         
6-49 to -50 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI 
/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074317.pdf. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See id. (listing “factors that may be relevant when deciding whether to 
recommend charging a misdemeanor violation”). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
8
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are not limited to: 
(1) [w]hether the violation involves actual or potential 
harm to the public; 
(2) [w]hether the violation is obvious; 
(3) [w]hether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal 
behavior and/or failure to heed prior warnings; 
(4) [w]hether the violation is widespread; 
(5) [w]hether the violation is serious; 
(6) the quality of the legal and factual support for the 
proposed prosecution; and 
(7) [w]hether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use 
of agency resources.35 
Today, the current penalties for responsible corporate officers 
prosecuted under the Park doctrine include fines, probation, jail 
time, and FDA debarment.36  In addition, the Department of 
Health and Human Services has the authority to exclude 
individuals from federally funded governmental programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid as a consequence of felony or 
misdemeanor convictions for fraud and other misconduct.37 
B. Prosecution of Sales Representatives, Managers, and Directors as 
Responsible Corporate Officers 
In a speech given at the 12th Annual Pharmaceutical 
Regulatory and Compliance Congress on November 2, 2011, 
Assistant Attorney General Tony West stated that “demanding 
accountability means we will consider prosecutions against 
individuals, including misdemeanor prosecutions under the Park 
doctrine.”38  The following examples illustrate that the government 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 335a–335b (2006). 
 37.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006).  See also Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 
98, 100–02 (D.D.C. 2010) (excluding three pharmaceutical company executives 
from participating in Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal healthcare programs 
for twelve years due to their misdemeanor guilty pleas to charges they served as 
“responsible corporate officers” who “had responsibility and authority either to 
prevent in the first instance or to promptly correct certain conduct resulting in the 
misbranding of Oxycontin” during a period in which the company admitted to 
marketing Oxycontin with the intent to defraud or mislead, in violation of the 
FDCA). 
 38.  Tony West, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 12th Annual 
Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2011/civ-speech-111102.html. 
9
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is prosecuting not only traditional executives under the responsible 
corporate officer doctrine, such as chief executive officers, but also 
less likely targets, including members of pharmaceutical and 
medical device sales forces. 
1. United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC 
In United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, the president, national 
sales director, and two regional sales managers of Stryker were 
indicted for wire fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and 
distribution of a misbranded device.39  One executive was also 
indicted for making false statements.40  According to the 
prosecution, the executives allegedly schemed to promote the 
combined use of Calstrux, a bone void filler, and OP-1, a protein 
that promotes bone growth, though the combination of the drugs 
had not been approved by the FDA, in order to grow sales.41  
Prosecutors further alleged that patients reported adverse events 
and that, after the executives were aware of these adverse events, 
they continued to promote off-label and did not warn physicians of 
the adverse events.42  During the trial of three of the executives and 
the company, the company pled guilty to a misdemeanor and paid 
a $15 million fine.43  Prosecutors subsequently dismissed all charges 
against all four executives after reviewing documents that showed 
the executives acted in good faith.44 
2. United States v. Caputo 
On February 4, 2003, the government brought a nineteen-
count indictment against three officers of AbTox, Inc., a 
 
 39.  United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO, 2010 WL 
2900684, at *1 (D. Mass. July 21, 2010); Superseding Indictment, Stryker Biotech, 
No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Oct. 11, 2011), 2011 WL 8612010; Indictment, Stryker 
Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Oct. 28, 2009), 2009 WL 3612189. 
 40.  Stryker Biotech, 2010 WL 2900684, at *1. 
 41.  Id. at *1–2. 
 42.  Id. at *5. 
 43.  Verdict, Agreement and Settlement, Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO 
(Jan. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 130887. 
 44.  Assented to Motion to Dismiss, Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO, 
(Feb. 2, 2012), ECF No. 309; Assented to Motion to Dismiss, Stryker Biotech, No. 09-
CR-10330-GAO (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 293; Assented to Motion to Dismiss, 
Stryker Biotech, No. 09-CR-10330-GAO (Jan. 17, 2012), ECF No. 284; David 
Voreacos, Stryker Official’s Charges Dropped as U.S. Cites New Evidence in Drug Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02   
-02/stryker-official-s-charges-dropped-as-u-s-cites-new-evidence-in-drug-case.html. 
10
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manufacturer of the Plazlyte sterilizer system, including the 
director of marketing and vice president of regulatory affairs.45  
According to the indictment, the defendants agreed, combined, 
and conspired to defraud the United States by selling an 
adulterated and misbranded device to various U.S. government 
agencies and representing that its sterilizer product had been 
cleared by the FDA.46  The director of marketing, who was later 
employed at AbTox as vice president of sales, pled guilty to 
introducing into interstate commerce an adulterated and 
misbranded device.47  His plea agreement specifically stated that 
“[a]s Director of Marketing, defendant . . . played an active role in 
the overall effort by AbTox to sell the unapproved sterilizer.  He 
played a role in developing and implementing AbTox’s marketing 
strategy, including its pricing and its promotional literature.”48  
“[D]efendant . . . also played a role . . . in devising AbTox’s 
marketing strategy and in training AbTox’s sales and field 
representatives to implement it.”49  The director of marketing was 
ultimately sentenced to probation for three years and a fine of 
$75,000.50 
3. United States v. Donofrio 
In United States v. Donofrio, a regional sales director for 
Exactech, Inc., waived prosecution by indictment for knowingly 
and willfully conspiring with others to violate the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.51  Specifically, the regional sales director was charged with 
offering payment to orthopedic surgeons for their use of certain 
 
 45.  Indictment, United States v. Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(No. 03CR0126), 2003 WL 23413059; see also United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 
2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  See generally Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 981 
(articulating the court’s reasons regarding the sentencing of defendants), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 517 F.3d 935, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming judgment of 
district court except with respect to restitution; the award of restitution was 
vacated and the case remanded for calculation of the amount owed). 
 46.  Indictment, supra note 45. 
 47.  Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Schmitt, No. 03 CR 126-3 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 23, 2003), 2003 WL 25609246.  
 48.  Id. at 4. 
 49.  Id. at 6. 
 50.  Sentencing Order at 3, Caputo, No. 1:03-cr-00126 (Aug. 22, 2006), ECF 
No. 432. 
 51.  Information at 1, United States v. Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB 
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
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hip and knee devices.52  The information alleged that from 2002 
through 2008, the regional sales director and coconspirators 
offered and entered into consulting agreements with orthopedic 
surgeons, which were designed to induce the surgeons to use and 
purchase Exactech, Inc.’s hip and knee products.53  The regional 
sales director pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback 
Statute54 and was sentenced to five years probation and a $6000 
fine.55 
4. United States v. Caronia 
In United States v. Caronia,56 a pharmaceutical sales 
representative for Orphan Medical, Inc. was charged with 
introduction of a misbranded drug into interstate commerce, 
healthcare fraud, and conspiracy to commit such violations.57  
Specifically, the indictment alleged that the defendant sales 
representative knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to 
misbrand the drug Xyrem by marketing it for off-label uses.58  The 
sales representative was found guilty of engaging in the interstate 
commerce of a misbranded drug.59  He was ultimately sentenced to 
one year of probation, 100 hours of community service, and a $25 
special assessment.60 
The sales representative appealed the conviction, arguing that 
his right to free speech under the First Amendment was being 
illegally restricted.61  On December 3, 2012, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
conviction and vacated the criminal conviction of the sales 
representative.62  The Second Circuit reasoned that the FDCA does 
 
 52.  Id. at 2. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
 55.  Judgment at 2, Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB (Mar. 5, 2011), ECF No. 
10; Plea Agreement at 2, Donofrio, No. 3:10-cr-00836-GEB (Dec. 7, 2010), ECF No. 
5. 
 56.  576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 57.  Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gleason, No. 06-229 (ENV) 
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007), 2007 WL 4185417. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Judgment at 1, Gleason, No. 06-229 (ENV) (Nov. 30, 2009), ECF No. 126. 
 60.  Id. at 1, 4–5. 
 61.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 33, United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 
149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 09-5006-cr), 2010 WL 6351495. 
 62.  See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152. 
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not criminalize “simple promotion” of a drug’s off-label use by a 
sales representative because “such a construction would raise First 
Amendment concerns.”63  The court ultimately held that “the 
government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the 
lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”64 
5. United States v. Orthofix, Inc. 
Orthofix, Inc., a manufacturer of a bone growth stimulator, 
pled guilty to an information charging it with obstruction of a 
federal audit for manipulating certificates of medical necessity, a 
form required by Medicare to be signed by a physician attesting 
that the bone growth stimulator was medically necessary.65  As part 
of the plea agreement, Orthofix agreed to pay a $7.65 million 
criminal fine and $34.23 million plus interest to resolve civil 
allegations under the False Claims Act.66  In addition to this plea 
agreement entered into by Orthofix, the investigation resulted in 
felony charges against executives, employees, and contractors of 
Orthofix.67  Specifically, a former Orthofix vice president of sales 
pled guilty to paying kickbacks to induce a doctor and a physician’s 
assistant to prescribe Orthofix products;68 a former Orthofix 
regional sales director pled guilty to making a false declaration to a 
grand jury about Orthofix conduct;69 and two former Orthofix 
territory managers pled guilty to falsifying patients’ medical records 
to fraudulently induce Medicare to pay for Orthofix bone growth 
stimulators.70 
 
 63.  Id. at 160. 
 64.  Id. at 169. 
 65.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Orthofix, Inc.                   
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony (June 7, 2012) [hereinafter USAO                      
Orthofix Press Release], available at www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2012/June 
/OrthofixSettlementPR.html. 
 66.  See id.  “The civil settlement resolves claims brought against Orthofix in a 
whistleblower lawsuit filed under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act 
that is pending in the District of Massachusetts: United States ex. rel. Bierman, v. 
Orthofix International, N.V., et al., Civil Action No. 05-10557-EFH (D. Mass.).”  Id. 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  Id.; see Plea Agreement, United States v. Guerrieri, No. 1:12-cr-10061-
RWZ (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2012), ECF No. 6. 
 69.  USAO Orthofix Press Release, supra note 65; see also Plea Agreement, 
United States v. Salzman, No. 1:11-cr-10385-RWZ (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2011), ECF 
No. 7. 
 70.  USAO Orthofix Press Release, supra note 65; see Plea Agreement, United 
States v. McKay, No. 1:12-cr-10129-DJC (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 2; Plea 
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C. Civil Products Liability Actions Based on Governmental Prosecution of 
Responsible Corporate Officers 
Just as government enforcement actions have recently focused 
on corporate officers, including sales directors, so too have civil 
products liability suits that incorporate or mimic these 
enforcement actions.  For example, in a government prosecution 
against bone cement manufacturer Norian, Corp., four former 
executives pled guilty, in 2009, to misdemeanor counts of shipping 
adulterated and misbranded Norian XR bone cement in interstate 
commerce.71  The indictment alleged that the former executives 
conspired to conduct unauthorized clinical trials of Norian’s bone 
cement in surgeries to treat vertebral compression fractures (VCFs) 
of the spine without alleged FDA-required clinical testing.72  At least 
three patients died during these allegedly unauthorized clinical 
trials.73  All four executives received jail sentences of at least five 
months and a fine of $100,000 each.74  The company pled guilty to 
felony and misdemeanor criminal charges and paid a $23.5 million 
fine.75 
As a direct result of this prosecution of the company and its 
corporate officers, civil products liability suits have been filed.  For 
example, Eva Sloan, individually and as executrix of the estate of 
Lois Eskind, sued Norian and Synthes, Inc. for fraud; conspiracy to 
 
Agreement, United States v. Field, No. 1:12-cr-10057-JLT (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2012), 
ECF No. 2; see also Electronic Clerk’s Notes, McKay, No. 1:12-cr-10129-DJC (May 
11, 2012) (stating, in part, “Defendant enters plea of guilty”); Electronic Clerk’s 
Notes, Field, No. 1:12-cr-10057-JLT (Mar. 22, 2012) (stating, in part, “Defendant 
enters plea of guilty”). 
 71.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Penn., Former Executives 
of International Medical Device Maker Sentenced to Prison in Unlawful Clinical 
Trials Case (Nov. 21, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2011 
/Nov/synthesexecs_release.pdf. 
 72.  Id.  VCFs are a painful condition where the bones of the spine become 
broken.  It is commonly suffered by elderly individuals.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Bohner, No. 2:09-
cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011), ECF No. 216; Judgment in a Criminal Case 
at 2, United States v. Walsh, No. 2:09-cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF 
No. 187; Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Higgins, No. 2:09-cr-
00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 186; Judgment in a Criminal Case at 
2, United States v. Huggins, No. 2:09-cr-00403-LDD (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF 
No. 185. 
 75.  Sophia Pearson, Synthes Sued over Death Linked to Bone-Cement Trials, 
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012     
-07-30/synthes-sued-over-death-related-to-unapproved-bone-cement-trial.html. 
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commit fraud; willful, wanton, malicious, and reckless misconduct; 
failure to warn; gross negligence; negligence per se; fraudulent 
concealment; and wrongful death.76  Ms. Sloan’s complaint is based 
on the same conduct at issue in the criminal investigations of the 
company and its executives—specifically, that the alleged 
unapproved clinical trial of bone cement caused the death of Lois 
Eskind after a surgeon injected the bone cement into her spine.77  
The defendants have denied all allegations.78  Similarly, the families 
of two other patients, who died during surgery that involved the use 
of the bone cement, filed suit against the company and the four 
former executives in California Superior Court alleging similar 
claims.79 
These “me too” products liability lawsuits are anticipated for 
the government enforcement actions against sales managers and 
directors.80  For example, the United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC81 
enforcement action prompted the filing of products liability 
lawsuits, including Cabana v. Stryker Biotech, LLC.  In Cabana, 
plaintiff April Cabana alleged she was injured by bone void filler 
products.82  The plaintiff specifically referenced the guilty plea of 
two Stryker Biotech sales representatives regarding the illegal 
 
 76.  Complaint at 30–46, Sloan v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-04286-LDD (E.D. 
Pa. July 27, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
 77.  Id. at 30–31. 
 78.  See Motion to Dismiss, Synthes, No. 2:12-cv-04286-LDD (Oct. 1, 2012), ECF 
No. 7. 
 79.  Complaint, Estate of Kikuchi v. Synthes, Inc., No. CIVMSC12-00518 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 29, 2012), ECF No. 1; see also Annie Reynolds, Families Sue Synthes 
over Bone Cement Surgery Death, SHERIDAN & MURRAY LLC (Mar. 20, 2012), http:// 
www.philadelphiainjurylawyerblogs.com/families-sue-synthes-over-bone-cement      
-surgery-deaths/. 
 80.  See, e.g., Abtox Sterilization System May Hurt People’s Corneas, SILVERMAN & 
FODERA, http://www.civilrights.com/AbtoxSterilizationSystem.php (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013) (advertising for personal injury suits related to the FDA warning 
and recall of the AbTox Plazlyte Sterilization System that may cause serious 
injuries to people’s corneas); Florida Hip Replacement Attorney, BERKE LAW FIRM, P.A., 
http://www.yourinjurylawyer.com/florida-hip-replacement-attorney/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (listing Exactech and Biomet as hip and knee                          
replacement manufacturers); Austin Kirk, Medtronic Infuse Lawyers Reviewing 
Lawsuits for Bone Graft Problems, SAIONTZ & KIRK P.A. (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.youhavealawyer.com/blog/2012/05/07/medtronic-infuse-lawyers/ 
(advertising for potential lawsuits related to “problems following off-label use of 
the genetically engineered bone growth stimulator”). 
 81.  United States v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. 09-10330-GAO, 2010 WL 
2900684 (D. Mass. July 21, 2010). 
 82.  Complaint, Cabana v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No. BC 465313 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. July 13, 2011). 
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promotion of the bone void filler products in violation of the 
FDCA: “By February 2009, two Stryker Biotech sales representatives 
had pled guilty to illegally promoting the mixture of OP-1 and 
Calstrux in violation of the FDCA.”83  She also referenced in her 
complaint the indictments of Stryker Biotech and its president 
“arising out of Stryker Biotech’s illegal off-label promotion of OP-1 
and Calstrux to surgeons in various states, including California.”84  
The plaintiff generally alleged that “the Stryker Defendants, 
through their sales representatives and paid Key Opinion Leaders, 
directly and indirectly promoted, trained and encouraged Dr. 
Mesiwala to engage in the off-label procedure of mixing Calstrux 
with OP-1 Putty.”85 
The Cabana complaint asserted claims of negligence, strict 
liability, breach of express and implied warranty, fraud, and 
negligence per se against the Stryker defendants.86  Specifically, the 
plaintiff alleged the Stryker defendants were negligent in (1) 
“engaging in the illegal off-label promotion of these products”; (2) 
“failing to disclose that the mixture of these two products had not 
been approved by the FDA”; (3) “failing to disclose to physicians 
that the mixture of these two products can result in serious side 
effects”; (4) “failing to fully disclose the results of the testing and 
other information in their possession regarding the possible 
adverse reactions associated with the off-label mixture”; (5) “failing 
to disclose the lack of clinical or other scientific evidence to 
support any particular ratio in the mixture”; (6) “representing that 
the mixture of these two products was safe”; (7) “promoting OP-1 
Putty beyond the narrow and limited Humanitarian Device 
Exception for which it was approved”; (8) “failing to adequately 
warn the medical community, the general public, plaintiff’s 
surgeon and plaintiff of the dangers, contra-indications, and side 
effects from the use, mixed use, and off-label use of these two 
products”; and (9) “failing to act as a reasonably prudent drug 
manufacturer.”87  The Stryker defendants denied all allegations.88 
 
 
 83.  See id. para. 57. 
 84.  See id. para. 58.  
 85.  See id. para. 89.  
 86.  See id. paras. 101–85. 
 87.  See id. para. 105. 
 88.  See Answer at 1, Cabana, No. BC 465313 (Nov. 28, 2011). 
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D. Evidentiary Issues in Products Liability Actions Where There Is a 
Parallel Government Prosecution 
Civil products liability cases involving sales representative 
allegations where there is a parallel government prosecution 
present unique evidentiary challenges.  Plaintiffs may want to 
introduce the government enforcement action into evidence in the 
civil case as evidence of wrongdoing or fraud by the defendant 
company or its sales offices or representatives.  This type of 
evidence is often subject to a pre-trial motion in limine, where the 
defendant will seek to exclude the evidence.89  While some courts 
have admitted evidence regarding prior government enforcement 
actions or settlements against the defendant company, other courts 
have excluded the evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial.90  A trial 
court’s determination of whether to admit evidence regarding a 
prior government enforcement action is highly fact dependent and 
generally will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion.91 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois 
provides a recent example of a court allowing into evidence at trial 
documents related to a government enforcement action.92  The 
court found that a defendant’s corporate integrity agreement93 
regarding, inter alia, compliance with the Anti-Kickback statute was 
 
 89.  See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., No. 3:09-md-2100-
DRH, 2011 WL 6740391, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011) (seeking exclusion of a 
corporate integrity agreement in a motion in limine); In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2009 WL 223140, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 
2009) (same); Block v. Abbott Labs., Inc., Nos. 99C7457, 01C1312, 01C1313, 
01C1315, 01C1316, 2001 WL 1539159, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001) (seeking 
exclusion of a consent decree between medical device manufacturer and FDA). 
 90.  See, e.g., Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4 (admitting evidence of a 
corporate integrity agreement); Seroquel, 2009 WL 223140, at *7 (excluding 
evidence of a corporate integrity agreement); Block, 2001 WL 1539159, at *2 
(excluding evidence of a consent decree between medical device manufacturer 
and FDA). 
 91.  See U.S. v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding admission of 
other crimes evidence “may be overturned only for an abuse of discretion”); 
Kramas v. Sec. Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding, in action 
for alleged violations of securities law, it was not reversible error for trial court to 
refuse to admit evidence of consent decree entered in prior securities 
enforcement proceedings against defendant and other persons in light of fact that 
“[t]he consent decree involved no finding of culpability and no judgment of 
wrongdoing” and the probative value of the evidence was “committed to the trial 
court’s sound discretion”). 
 92.  See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4. 
 93.  See supra note 14. 
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relevant evidence in a civil products liability litigation.94  The 
corporate integrity agreement also specifically referenced a 
settlement agreement with the United States that was being filed 
contemporaneously with the corporate integrity agreement.95  The 
motions in limine related to one or more cases that were a part of 
the In re Yasmin and Yas (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices and 
PMF Products Liability Litigation.96  The complaints alleged claims for 
strict products liability, breach of express and implied warranty, 
negligence, negligence per se, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent concealment, fraud, and misrepresentation related to 
the plaintiffs’ ingestion of the oral contraceptive Yasmin (also 
known as YAZ, Ocella, and drospirenone and ethinyl estradiol).97  
The court provided very little reasoning, other than that the 
agreements were relevant and a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)98 
character evidence analysis was not required, but even if such an 
analysis were performed, the evidence was admissible to show 
intent and lack of mistake.99  Although the briefing in this case is 
sealed, presumably the defendant argued that the corporate 
integrity agreement should not be admissible at trial because it is 
evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act” used to prove Bayer’s 
character and that, here, Bayer acted in accordance with that 
character.100  Despite the fact that the corporate integrity 
agreement makes no mention of the product at issue in the case—
 
 94.  Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
AND BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC 13 (2008) [hereinafter BAYER CORPORATE                
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT], available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements 
/fully_executed_bayer_cia_112508.pdf. 
 95.  BAYER CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT, supra note 94, at 1. 
 96.  Sims v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No. 3:09-cv-10012-DRH-PMF, 2011 
WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011); Bradish v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No. 
3:09-cv-20021-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011), Laforet-Neer 
v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., No. 3:10-cv-10223, 2011 WL 6740391 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 
22, 2011). 
 97.  See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Laforet-Neer, No. 3:10-cv-10223-DRH-PMF (Feb. 
23, 2010), ECF No. 2. 
 98.  FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides, “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is 
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character;” however, “[t]his 
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident.” 
 99.  See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4. 
 100.  FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
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the drug Yaz—the court still found the agreement relevant and 
admissible.101 
Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida found a corporate integrity agreement with the federal 
government related to the pricing of an anti-cancer medication was 
not relevant in civil products liability litigation involving the 
company’s anti-psychotic medication.102  Plaintiffs argued that they 
would not introduce evidence of the anti-cancer litigation and 
settlement except to rebut any “good corporate citizen” testimony 
offered by the defendants at trial.103  The court found that “a party’s 
agreement as to a particular standard of care for a completely 
different medication, used to treat a completely different 
condition—cancer—is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case; its 
prejudice outweighs any potential probative value, wastes time, and 
will confuse the jury.”104 
Other courts have evaluated whether consent decrees entered 
into between the FDA and pharmaceutical or medical device 
manufacturers are admissible.  For example, in Block v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.,105 the plaintiffs sought discovery regarding a 
consent decree between Abbott and the FDA regarding failure to 
comply with FDA regulations.106  The court evaluated whether such 
discovery would be relevant, finding that “the Consent Decree is 
not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.”107  The court reasoned that the 
consent decree did not identify the product at issue in the products 
liability suit as one of the Abbott products of concern.108  The court 
also found that the consent decree was focused on manufacturing 
deficiencies whereas the plaintiffs’ complaint was based upon 
design defects and a failure to warn.109  The court 
concluded,“Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how Abbott’s 
 
 101.  See Yasmin, 2011 WL 6740391, at *4; see generally BAYER CORPORATE 
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT, supra note 94. 
 102.  See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2009 
WL 223140, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2009). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Nos. 99C7457, 01C1312, 01C1313, 01C1315, 01C1316, 2001 WL 1539159, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. (citing Rufer v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 99-2-27090-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 19, 2001), which reached the same conclusion and found evidence of the 
consent decree not admissible at trial). 
 108.  See id. at *3. 
 109.  See id. 
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manufacturing practices are relevant to their case.”110 
Another court evaluated whether a products liability claim 
could be filed based entirely on a consent decree.  In Polk v. KV 
Pharmaceutical Co.,111 the plaintiff filed a putative class action against 
KV Pharmaceutical Company and Ther-Rx Corporation, in 
connection with plaintiff’s use of metroprolol succinate ER.112  
Prior to the plaintiff’s suit, the FDA formally alleged the defendants 
were not in compliance with current good manufacturing practices 
and alleged the medication produced in their facilities was 
adulterated.113  The FDA and the defendants entered into a consent 
decree in which the defendants neither admitted nor denied the 
allegations levied by the FDA, and the defendants also recalled 
inventories of metroprolol succinate ER.114  The U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff relied heavily on the consent 
decree, which was “not conclusive proof of wrongdoing” and could 
not be used to “bootstrap Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants in the 
absence of any independent factual allegation . . . that the 
Medication was somehow defective because it is unfit for the 
ordinary purposes for which it was marketed, thereby injuring the 
Plaintiff.”115 
Various governmental agencies have made it clear that they 
intend to hold executives, including sales executives, criminally 
liable for violations of health care laws.  Similarly, manufacturers 
should be aware that aside from exposing themselves and their 
sales representatives to personal criminal and civil liability for 
government enforcement actions, any such enforcement actions 
may also expose the company and its sales representatives to 
additional civil products liability claims.  Moreover, a company 
should keep in mind that the outcome of any investigation, 
whether it is no action, a consent decree, a corporate integrity 
agreement, a fine, or other result, may have implications in its 
portfolio of civil products liability litigation, even if entirely 
unrelated to the medical device at issue in the civil products 
liability lawsuit. 
 
 110.  See id. 
 111.  No. 4:09-CV-00588 SNLJ, 2011 WL 6257466, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 
2011). 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at *3, *8. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF RIEGEL ON SALES REPRESENTATIVE LIABILITY 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. has 
changed the landscape of medical device products liability 
lawsuits.116  This section will briefly discuss the Riegel decision and 
then examine the impact that the decision has had on the type of 
claims that plaintiffs are bringing to avoid preemption.  As this 
section will demonstrate, Riegel has caused plaintiffs to assert novel 
theories of liability against medical device manufacturers that 
commonly attack the alleged actions, inactions, and 
representations of the manufacturers’ sales representatives.  Finally, 
this section will examine the small number of judicial decisions that 
have discussed whether Riegel preemption applies even when sales 
representative liability is asserted and possible areas where a 
plaintiff may be able to plead a non-preempted claim against a sales 
representative. 
A. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. Overview 
The express preemption clause contained in the Medical 
Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the FDCA specifies that no state is 
permitted to impose “any requirement” relating to the safety or 
effectiveness of a medical device or any other matter regulated by 
the MDA that is “different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable . . . to the device.”117  Because of the extensive 
requirements imposed upon medical devices through the 
premarket approval (PMA) process and the express preemption 
provision in the MDA, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Riegel that 
any state law tort claim seeking to impose requirements “different 
from, or in addition to” those imposed by the PMA process is 
expressly preempted.118  Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the MDA’s express preemption provision “bars common-law 
claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a medical device 
 
 116.  552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008). 
 117.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).  Specifically, the MDA preemption provision 
provides that no state or political subdivision of a state may establish or continue 
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement “(1) 
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this [Act] 
to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to 
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
[Act].”  Id. (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45 (1976). 
 118.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–22. 
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given premarket approval by the [FDA].”119  In concluding the 
MDA’s preemption clause “‘remove[s] all means of judicial 
recourse’ for consumers injured by FDA-approved devices,” the 
Court explained that 
the text of the statute . . . suggests that the solicitude for 
those injured by FDA-approved devices . . . was overcome 
in Congress’s estimation by solicitude for those who would 
suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed 
to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations.120 
In Riegel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s Class III 
medical device was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a 
manner that violated state common law and that these defects 
caused severe injuries.121  In resolving whether the plaintiffs’ claims 
were preempted, the Court established a two-step procedure.  First, 
courts must determine whether “the Federal Government has 
established requirements applicable to” the particular medical 
device.122  The Court found that medical devices approved through 
the PMA process automatically satisfy the first prong of the Riegel 
preemption analysis.123 
As a second step, courts must then determine whether the 
state law claims at issue “are based upon . . . requirements with 
respect to the device that are ‘different from, or in addition to’” 
those imposed by the MDA and if they are, then the claims are 
preempted.124  The Riegel Court found that the plaintiffs’ state law 
defective design, defective manufacturing, defective testing, and 
failure to warn claims sounding in strict liability, negligence, and 
breach of implied warranty “constitute[d] ‘requirements’ under 
the MDA.”125  The Court reasoned that “State tort law that requires 
a manufacturer’s [device] to be safer, but hence less effective, than 
the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme” and 
the judgment of a jury should not second-guess the judgment of 
“the experts at the FDA.”126  For purposes of the MDA’s preemption 
 
 119.  Id. at 315. 
 120.  Id. at 326.  
 121.  Id. at 320.  
 122.  Id. at 321. 
 123.  Id. at 323; see also DeLeon v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C-1-177, 2011 WL 
2618957, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2011); Yost v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:09-cv-28-FtM-
29DNF, 2010 WL 1141586, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010). 
 124.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
 125.  Id. at 323–24. 
 126.  Id. at 325. 
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clause, state common law duties constitute “requirements,” and 
“the duties underlying negligence, strict-liability, and implied-
warranty claims are . . . maintained with respect to devices.”127 
Therefore, Riegel held unequivocally that the MDA expressly 
preempts state common-law causes of action that impose 
“different” or “addition[al]” requirements than any requirement 
imposed by the PMA of a device.128  The Court recognized, 
however, that the MDA “does not prevent a State from providing a 
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA 
regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than 
add to, federal requirements.”129  The Court recognized that the 
issue of whether the plaintiffs had pled a parallel claim was not 
before them and declined to elaborate on what would constitute a 
non-preempted parallel claim.130  Since Riegel, plaintiffs’ primary 
focus has been trying to plead claims that fit within this 
“loophole.”131 
B. Riegel’s Effect on Plaintiffs’ Products Liability Claims 
As other commentators have noted, lower courts’ application 
of Riegel preemption has been somewhat inconsistent.132  
Nonetheless, post-Riegel, the majority of courts addressing state tort 
law claims involving a Class III medical device have found that the 
plaintiffs’ claims are preempted.133  In Riegel, the Supreme Court 
 
 127.  Id. at 323–26 (internal quotations omitted). 
 128.  See id. at 321–22. 
 129.  Id. at 330. 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  See generally Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Note, Medical Devices and Preemption: 
A Defense of Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1196–97 (2011). 
 132.  See Samuel Raymond, Note, Judicial Politics and Medical Device Preemption 
After Riegel, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 745, 749–51 (2010). 
 133.  See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1152 (D. Minn. 2009) (“In the . . . months following Riegel, 
courts across the country have applied Section 360k(a) broadly, preempting all 
manner of claims . . . .”) (finding breach of express and implied warranty claims, 
fraud claims, and claims for deceptive trade practices preempted); see also James 
M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability Litigation: Where We Are 
and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 678–79 (2009) (noting the 
extensive preemption of premarket approval devices); Malika Kanodia, Comment, 
The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress 
Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 794 (2009) (“[Riegel] virtually ensures that 
medical device manufacturers enjoy legal immunity from injury claims involving 
products that have secured premarket approval from the FDA.”). 
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suggested that the scope of preemption encompasses traditional 
products liability claims such as those alleging negligence, strict 
liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranty.134  Lower courts 
have been fairly consistent in finding that these types of claims are 
preempted pursuant to Riegel.  For example, courts have regularly 
dismissed failure to warn claims involving a Class III medical 
device’s labeling on preemption grounds.135  Similarly, courts have 
found breach of warranty and garden-variety negligence claims 
asserted against manufacturers to be preempted.136 
Because a large number of traditional claims against medical 
device manufacturers have been summarily dismissed, plaintiffs 
have been forced to seek creative means for pleading a non-
preempted claim.  One common way that plaintiffs have tried to 
avoid preemption is by framing their claims as seeking to enforce 
parallel state obligations to federal law.137  However, several courts 
 
 134.  See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 327–29. 
 135.  See, e.g., Leonard v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-03787-JEC, 2011 WL 
3652311, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2011) (dismissing failure to warn claims on 
express preemption grounds); Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 
1270, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Parker 
v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (D. Colo. 2008) (same).  However, 
even the causes of action specifically addressed in Riegel have not been universally 
found to be preempted.  The District Court of Puerto Rico recently found that 
plaintiffs’ claim that they received no warning regarding an EON rechargeable 
impulse generator was not preempted, noting that the plaintiffs were not 
“advocating for labeling or warning that is different from or in addition to that 
which is already approved in the device PMA.”  Carrelo v. Advanced 
Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (D.P.R. 2011); see also Hofts 
v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 830, 832 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (finding 
no preemption, despite Riegel’s overt criticism of § 808.1(d)(1)). 
 136.  For examples of breach of warranty claims against manufacturers that 
courts have found to be preempted, see Heisner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 08-C-593, 
2009 WL 1210633, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2009) (breach of express warranty claim 
preempted); Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 284–87 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009) (breach of express warranty, implied warranty of fitness, and implied 
warranty of merchantability claims, as well as state law claim for deceptive trade 
practices preempted); Parker, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1301–03 (breach of express 
warranty, implied warranty of fitness, and implied warranty of merchantability 
claims preempted).  For examples of courts finding that a negligence claim is 
preempted, see Walker v. Medtronic, Inc., 670 F.3d 569, 577–81 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(finding claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty preempted); 
Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 473 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding 
negligence claims preempted); Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 
1264, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“Florida law does not authorize the only type of 
‘negligence’ claims that might survive the MDA, i.e., a claim based on violation of 
federal requirements.”).  
 137.  See, e.g., Steiden v. Genzyme Biosurgery, No. 3:11 CV-441-S, 2012 WL 
2923225, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. July 18, 2012) (finding that plaintiff pled non-
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have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid preemption simply by 
repeatedly referencing “parallel claims” in their complaints, 
finding that the claims are nothing more than repackaged claims to 
impose additional or different obligations on device manufacturers 
and thus are preempted pursuant to Riegel.138  The key factor for 
many courts in deciding whether plaintiffs have adequately pled a 
parallel claim that avoids preemption is whether they explicitly 
plead that the defendant violated a specific FDA regulation.139  
Plaintiffs have also regularly attempted to avoid preemption by 
alleging that a manufacturer withheld or misrepresented risk 
information associated with its device during the premarket 
approval process.140  However, courts have largely rejected such 
claims as barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckman v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, where the Court held that fraud-on-the-
FDA claims are impliedly preempted by federal law.141 
 
preempted claim of adulteration); Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 
161–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to plead a parallel claim); 
Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658–59 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing 
plaintiff’s attempt to plead a state law parallel claim). 
 138.  See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 
F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–65 (D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that 
claim was not preempted because parallel to federal law); Link v. Zimmer 
Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178–80 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same); Heisner v. 
Genzyme Corp., No. 08-C-593, 2008 WL 2940811, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2008) 
(same); Mattingly v. Hubbard, No. 07CI12014, 2008 WL 3895381 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 
30, 2008) (same); see also Stevens v. Pacesetter, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-3812, 2008 WL 
2637417, at *1–2 (D.S.C. Apr. 1, 2008) (ruling that wife’s loss of consortium claim 
was not a parallel claim because it relied on the same alleged wrongful conduct as 
the patient’s claims to impose additional or different requirements on the 
manufacturer). 
 139.  See, e.g., Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 440–42 
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding claim alleging manufacturer violated good 
manufacturing practice federal rule not preempted); Rhynes v. Stryker Corp., No. 
10-5619 SC, 2011 WL 5117168, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (allowing plaintiffs 
leave to amend to more specifically allege violations of particular FDA 
requirements); Phillips v. Stryker Corp., No. 3:09-CV-488, 2010 WL 2270683, at *7 
(E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010) (ruling that claims alleging manufacturer’s conduct 
violated 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20(b)(2) and 820.70(e) were parallel and not 
preempted); Horowitz, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (requiring plaintiff to plead the 
specific PMA requirement allegedly violated).  
 140.  See, e.g., Leonard, 2011 WL 3652311, at *11 (alleging that medical device 
manufacturer withheld information from the FDA); Clark v. Medtronic, Inc., 572 
F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (D. Minn. 2008) (arguing that defendant violated 
premarket approval authority); McCutcheon v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 917, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same). 
 141.  See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) 
(holding that Congress has given the FDA exclusive power to enforce the FDCA 
and MDA).  For examples of cases finding claims to be preempted by Buckman, see 
25
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C. Novel Allegations Against Sales Representatives Post-Riegel 
As is the case in most products liability lawsuits, the majority of 
post-Riegel medical device lawsuits have involved claims arising from 
a manufacturer’s design and labeling for a device.  However, as one 
court has stated, it is “a narrow gap through which a plaintiff’s 
state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express or implied 
preemption.”142  Accordingly, in addition to attempting to 
repackage and attach different labels to their claims against 
medical device manufacturers, plaintiffs have also started to attack 
actions and representations made by a manufacturer’s sales 
representative.  An examination of these different types of theories 
is useful to better understand how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Riegel has resulted in plaintiffs increasingly scrutinizing the actions 
undertaken by medical device sales representatives. 
1. Duty to Warn, Supervise, or Train 
Perhaps the most common type of claim against medical 
device sales representatives asserts that the representative breached 
his or her duty to protect the patient by failing to adequately warn, 
supervise, or train the operating physician.  Although these types of 
claims existed prior to Riegel, they have become more prevalent in 
the post-Riegel legal environment.143  A large portion of failure to 
warn claims involve a sales representative failing to verbally advise a 
physician about the use or implantation of the product.144  For 
 
Leonard, 2011 WL 3652311, at *8; Clark, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (holding that 
plaintiff’s efforts to avoid Riegel preemption by relying on the manufacturer’s 
alleged withholding risk information from FDA are prohibited by Buckman 
because “Congress has granted the FDA exclusive power to enforce MDA 
premarket approvals”); McCutcheon, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 922.  But see Heisner, 2008 
WL 2940811, at *5 (suggesting that a claim resting on a manufacturer’s failure to 
fully participate in the PMA process is a parallel claim that is not preempted). 
 142.  In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 
1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 
(D. Minn. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (alleging “breach of the duty to use reasonable care in the 
instruction and education of physicians”); Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d 
790, 802 (W.D. La. 2008) (alleging that manufacturer failed to adequately train 
doctor about medical device used during an angiogram); O’Connell v. Biomet, 
Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1280 (Colo. App. 2010) (regarding plaintiff alleging that the 
manufacturer and sales representative failed to provide adequate warnings and 
instructions to surgeons about the dangers and installation of the elbow fixator). 
 144.  Reuter v. Medtronic, Inc., No. L-2592-10, 2012 WL 3635955, at *1 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. June 18, 2012) (regarding plaintiff seeking to amend 
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example, in Harrington v. Biomet, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the 
sales representative was negligent for not advising the surgeon as to 
what size and type of components to use in a hip replacement 
surgery and for not suggesting that a different implant might be 
more appropriate for a younger individual, such as the plaintiff.145  
In addition to alleging that a sales representative failed to verbally 
warn a physician about a risk associated with a medical device, 
plaintiffs have also based negligence claims on a representative’s 
failure to provide written package inserts to a physician.146 
While failure to warn and failure to train claims normally focus 
on what a sales representative failed to do, plaintiffs have also 
attacked the actions that the sales representative actually 
undertook.  In Adkins v. Cytyc Corp., the plaintiff’s claim was based 
on allegations that the defendant’s sales representative—who was 
present during the plaintiff’s medical procedure—deviated from 
FDA-approved materials and provided inaccurate information to 
the treating physician that resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries.147  In 
another case challenging a sales representative’s actions, rather 
than inactions, the plaintiff in William Beaumont Hospital v. 
Medtronic, Inc., alleged that the manufacturer’s representative sent 
a free sample of its pain pump refill kit to the wrong hospital 
department and represented that the sample could be used in a 
refill procedure, when in fact it could not, because the sample was 
a catheter access kit used for a different purpose.148 
2. Off-Label Use and Promotion 
Plaintiffs have also commonly brought claims focusing on a 
device’s off-label use in an attempt to avoid preemption, despite 
the fact that the device at issue in Riegel—a balloon catheter—had 
been used off label.149  Off-label use of a medical device occurs 
 
complaint to add negligence claim based on sales representative’s presence in 
operating room and failure to advise physician of potential defect with the device). 
 145.  No. CIV-07-25-R, 2008 WL 2329132, at *7 (W.D. Okla. June 3, 2008). 
 146.  See Wehner v. Linvatech Corp., No. 06-CV-1709 JMR/FLN, 2008 WL 
495525, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2008) (alleging that the manufacturer violated its 
duty to warn because sales representatives did not provide package inserts to 
physicians). 
 147.  No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. July 3, 2008). 
 148.  No. 09-CV-11941, 2009 WL 2849546, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2009). 
 149.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008) (concerning a 
catheter that was used in a diffusely diseased and heavily calcified artery, despite 
warnings that such use was contraindicated and was inflated beyond its rated burst 
pressure). 
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when a device is used in a manner different from the use approved 
by the FDA.150  Although FDA has the power to regulate off-label 
promotion of devices, it does not have any power “to limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to 
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for 
any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.”151 
In light of Riegel, plaintiffs are asserting that a device 
manufacturer’s off-label promotion of its products allows otherwise 
preempted failure-to-warn or negligence claims to survive 
preemption.152  The implication of a sales representative’s conduct 
in a plaintiff’s claim relating to off-label promotion is evident in the 
recent case Hall v. Horn Medical, L.L.C.153  In Hall, the plaintiff 
brought negligence claims against a distributor of a spinal-fusion 
device and a negligent-misrepresentation claim against an 
independent contractor working as a sales representative for the 
distributor.154  The implanting surgeon ignored explicit instructions 
in the device’s package insert and testified that he performed the 
procedure because the sales representative told him that the device 
was appropriate for this particular “off-label use.”155  In other cases, 
plaintiffs have alleged that a sales representative’s mere presence at 
a procedure involving an off-label use of a device constitutes 
unlawful off-label marketing and promotion and allows otherwise 
preempted claims to survive.156 
3. Unauthorized Practice of Medicine 
Sales representatives who engage in extensive conduct in the 
operating room or in pretreatment analysis of medical records or 
radiology films often run the risk of running afoul of a state statute 
 
 150.  See Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
 151.  21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006).  
 152.  Coleman v. Medtronic Corp., No. SC112290, 2012 WL 2335532, at *1 
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2012) (addressing claims of off-label promotion); O’Shea 
v. Cordis Corp., No. 50 2006 CA 013019 AA, 2008 WL 3139428, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
May 19, 2008) (same); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1057 (N.J. 
2012) (same). 
 153.  No. 11-1032, 2012 WL 1752546, at *1 (E.D. La. May 16, 2012). 
 154.  Id. at *1, *3. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 
(M.D. Fla. 2009); see also Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 778 (D. Minn. 
2009) (rejecting argument that off-label use makes Riegel inapplicable). 
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regulating the unauthorized practice of medicine.157  Although 
some states have made the unauthorized practice of medicine a 
crime,158 plaintiffs may also bring civil claims against medical device 
sales representatives based on these statutes.  In Disbrow v. Smith & 
Nephew Richards Inc., the plaintiffs sued the device manufacturer 
and its sales representative for “practicing medicine without a 
license” when a handle on a tool being used in plaintiff’s hip 
replacement surgery broke.159  According to the plaintiffs, the sales 
representative was present during the surgery and was responsible 
for locating a new handle for the tool.160  Likewise, in Wilkerson v. 
Christian, a patient underwent a procedure to remove tumors from 
her liver by burning them with an electrode.161  After the procedure 
was unsuccessful and the patient died, the plaintiff brought a 
wrongful death action against the manufacturer of the electrode 
and its sales representative alleging that the sales representative 
“personally performed the ablation procedure when she operated 
medical equipment that was directly, by way of a continuous circuit, 
inserted into [Plaintiff’s] body.”162  Although the case was dismissed 
on statute of limitations grounds, the court noted: “Plaintiff alleged 
facts, in good faith, that raise serious questions regarding the 
propriety of sales representatives in the operating room.  The 
gravity of Plaintiff’s allegation that a sales representative 
performed, or participated in, [Plaintiff’s] tumor ablation 
procedure is not lost on this court.”163 
4. Invasion of Privacy/Informed Consent and Assault/Battery 
Another theory that plaintiffs traditionally have advanced and 
possibly will assert more frequently against sales representatives 
post-Riegel is that a sales representative’s undisclosed presence 
 
 157.  For examples of state statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of 
medicine by non-physicians, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 6 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 2d Annual Sess. General Court) and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.001 
(West, Westlaw through end of 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d 
Legislature) (requiring a medical license to practice medicine). 
 158.  For examples of state statutes making the unauthorized practice of 
medicine a crime, see MINN. STAT. § 147.081 (2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 
§ 165.153(a) (Westlaw). 
 159.  No. 14-95-00759-CV, 1996 WL 593780, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
1996). 
 160.  Id. at *2. 
 161.  No. 1:06CV00871, 2008 WL 483445, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2008). 
 162.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 163.  Id. at *13. 
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during a surgery constituted an invasion of the patient’s privacy.  A 
claim for intentional invasion of privacy occurs when someone 
“intentionally intrudes . . . upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs . . . if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”164  Thus, plaintiffs have argued 
that a sales representative’s presence during a medical procedure—
without the consent of the patient—constitutes an invasion of 
privacy.165  For instance, in McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., a patient and 
her husband sued a medical device manufacturer, sales consultant, 
and the hospital for, inter alia, invasion of privacy as a result of the 
sales consultant’s attendance during a surgical procedure where an 
allegedly defective orthopedic implant was removed and taken by 
the sales representative for analysis.166  Similarly, in Wolicki-Gables v. 
Arrow International, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the sales 
representative violated his informed consent by attending a surgical 
procedure and disposing of a catheter connector removed during 
the procedure.167 
Under some states’ laws, similar allegations can also give rise to 
a claim for battery if the sales representative directly or indirectly 
touched the patient without his or her express consent.  For 
example, in Clifford v. Tacogue, the plaintiff brought a claim for 
medical battery against the manufacturer of a vascular closure 
device used during a cardiac catheterization.168  In this case, the 
plaintiff asserted that the manufacturer was vicariously liable for 
the sales representative entering the operation room and providing 
the doctor with a closure device, which the doctor then allegedly 
implanted without the patient’s consent.169 
 
 164.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 165.  See, e.g., McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-245RM, 2007 WL 
3232186, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2007).  In a slightly different context, the 
plaintiff in Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals alleged that a pharmaceutical sales 
representative observed her follow-up breast cancer appointment without 
informing her that the individual observing the appointment was a drug 
representative.  103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410 (Ct. App. 2001).  After the trial court 
dismissed the patient’s complaint, the California Court of Appeal reversed, 
holding that breast cancer patients have an objectively reasonable expectation that 
they will not be observed by anyone other than medical personnel.  Id. at 418. 
 166.  McDaniel, 2007 WL 3232186, at *1. 
 167.  641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 
(11th Cir. 2011). 
 168.  No. M2009-01703-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2712534, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
July 8, 2010). 
 169.  Id. at *1–2. 
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D. Preemption of Claims Involving Allegations of Sales Representative 
Misconduct 
Despite the variety of claims being brought against sales 
representatives in the post-Riegel landscape, only a handful of courts 
have explicitly analyzed whether claims seeking to impose liability 
based on the action or inaction of a medical device sales 
representative survive preemption.  This part will analyze the 
reasoning used by the courts that have applied the Riegel analysis in 
the context of sales representative liability and also discuss some 
cases outside the context of sales representative liability, but that 
nonetheless could be useful to a party seeking to evoke the 
preemption defense set forth in Riegel. 
Although plaintiffs have increasingly pled claims based on the 
conduct of sales representatives, their attempts to avoid Riegel 
preemption in this manner have been met with mixed results.  At 
least one court has found that claims against sales representatives 
are preempted in their entirety.  In Wolicki-Gables, the plaintiff 
attempted to avoid preemption of his traditional products liability 
claims against the manufacturer of a pain pump by focusing on the 
alleged actions of the manufacturer’s representative, who was 
present during a surgical procedure.170  In this case, the plaintiff 
asserted that the sales representative was negligent because he: (1) 
breached a duty to instruct and educate the implanting doctor 
about the pump; (2) breached a duty to ensure the pump worked 
properly before it was implanted; (3) breached a duty to verify 
informed consent to his presence; and (4) breached a duty to verify 
that plaintiff consented to disposal of a removed part of the 
device.171  Without much discussion of its preemption analysis, the 
court ruled that all of the claims against the manufacturer for strict 
liability, negligence, and vicarious liability, as well as the negligence 
claims against the representative, were expressly preempted under 
Riegel.172 
On the other hand, one of the most plaintiff-friendly decisions 
analyzing preemption in the context of sales representative liability 
 
 170.  641 F. Supp. 2d at 1282–91. 
 171.  Id. at 1291. 
 172.  Id. at 1282–87, 1291.  The court in Wolicki-Gables also provided alternative 
grounds for dismissing the plaintiff’s claims based on the sales representative’s 
conduct, most notably the lack of any duty to undertake the actions asserted by the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 1291. 
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is the decision in Adkins v. Cytyc Corp.173  In Adkins, the plaintiff 
alleged that the manufacturer was negligent based on its sales 
representative’s directions for surgery and preoperative 
procedures.174  In reasoning that such a claim was not preempted, 
the court noted that “[t]he FDA does not regulate interactions 
between corporate representatives and physicians on-site at a 
particular surgery,” and “[t]hese localized situations are traditional 
matters for the common law.”175  Therefore, the court ruled that, 
because such a claim did not challenge the design, manufacture, or 
labeling of the device, it was not preempted by Riegel.176  As two 
legal commentators have noted, pursuant to the reasoning in 
Adkins, almost any claim based upon a representative’s actions at a 
surgery would survive preemption.177 
Similar reasoning is found in the decision in William Beaumont 
Hospital v. Medtronic, Inc.178  In this case, the court acknowledged—
as it must—that any claim based on the device’s FDA-approved 
label was preempted by Riegel.179  However, the court found that the 
plaintiffs’ claim alleging liability based on the actions of a sales 
representative in sending samples to the wrong hospital 
department did not call into question the adequacy of the label 
and, thus, the claim survived preemption.180 
Several courts have found that claims alleging off-label 
promotion—claims that almost necessarily implicate the actions of 
a sales representative in charge of such promotion—are not 
preempted under Riegel.181  In one of these cases, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court recently held that, to the extent the defendant 
manufacturer and its employees marketed or promoted off-label 
uses of a device outside of the FDCA safe harbor for certain 
 
 173.  No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474 (W.D. Va. July 3, 2008). 
 174.  Id. at *2. 
 175.  Id. at *3. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See Edward W. Gerecke & David J. Walz, Sales Reps in the OR: The Hunt for 
Non-Preempted Claims, FOR DEF., Oct. 2010, at 27. 
 178.  No. 09-CV-11941, 2009 WL 2849546, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2009). 
 179.  Id. at *7. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See, e.g., James v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:10–CV–2082, 2011 WL 292240, at 
*3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (plaintiff’s allegations against manufacturer relating to 
off-label promotion not preempted); O’Shea v. Cordis, No. 50 2006 CA 013019 
AA, 2008 WL 3139428 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2008) (“Claims asserting that the 
Defendants were negligent in marketing and promoting off label uses are not 
preempted.”); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1057 (N.J. 2012) 
(same). 
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promotional activities, the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim survived 
preemption.182  Similarly, the federal court in James v. Stryker Corp. 
reasoned that claims attacking a manufacturer’s off-label 
promotion of a device are different from a failure to warn claim 
and survive preemption.183  However, it should also be noted that 
some courts have found that claims involving unlawful off-label 
promotion of a device may be impliedly preempted under the 
Supreme Court’s Buckman decision because “enforcing the FDCA is 
exclusively the province of the federal government.”184 
Although not explicitly discussing sales representatives, several 
judicial decisions have found that claims alleging that a 
manufacturer failed to adequately train a physician about its 
product are expressly preempted.185  Because sales representatives 
are often the individuals who communicate directly with a 
physician about how to use a device, their conduct will often play a 
central role in such claims.186  An example of a court’s preemption 
analysis in the failure to train context is evident in Rollins v. St. Jude 
Medical, in which the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed 
to train her surgeon on the proper use of the Angio-Seal device 
implanted during an angiogram.187  The court ruled that the failure 
to train claim pled by the plaintiff was preempted, but noted that a 
claim that the defendant manufacturer failed to abide by the 
training requirements imposed by the FDA would survive 
preemption as a parallel claim.188 
Preemption decisions analyzing fraud and express warranty 
claims also provide some insight into whether a claim challenging 
representations made by a sales representative would be found 
preempted.  Although the majority of courts have found express 
 
 182.  Cornett, 48 A.3d at 1057. 
 183.  James, 2011 WL 292240, at *3. 
 184.  Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 185.  See, e.g., Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div., Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 931–33 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that that a plaintiff’s failure-to-train claims were preempted 
because the manufacturer’s training requirements and informational materials 
had been previously approved by the FDA as part of the premarket approval 
process); Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801–02 (W.D. La. 2008) 
(rejecting claim of failure to train physician); Mattingly v. Hubbard, No. 
07CI12014, 2008 WL 3895381 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 30, 2008) (holding that claim 
made against manufacturer for failure to train physicians is preempted). 
 186.  See generally Gerecke & Walz, supra note 177 (noting that often “the case 
against a manufacturer’s representative really boils down to a claim for ‘failure to 
train my physician’”). 
 187.  583 F. Supp. 2d at 801–02. 
 188.  Id. at 802. 
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warranty claims based on a device’s label or representations about 
the safety and effectiveness of the device to be preempted,189 a few 
courts have held that breach of express warranty claims are not 
necessarily preempted if they involve statements not approved or 
mandated by the FDA, as these claims are more akin to a 
contractual bargain between parties and are outside the purview of 
the FDA.190  For example, in Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, the court 
held that the plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims were preempted, 
“except to the extent plaintiffs allege defendants have made 
voluntary statements to third parties beyond and different from the 
information on the approved label or packaging.”191  However, at 
least one court has expressed doubt as to whether a mere statement 
about a product by a sales representative to a doctor would 
constitute an express warranty under state law.192 
A handful of courts have applied the same preemption 
reasoning to fraud and misrepresentation claims, finding that these 
claims based on unregulated statements to doctors may survive 
preemption.193  These courts have reasoned that this type of fraud 
 
 189.  See, e.g., Cooley v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-30-ART, 2012 WL 1380265, at 
*4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2012) (finding that the MDA preempts express warranty 
claims relating to the safety and efficacy of a device because a finding that the 
device was not safe and effective would be contrary to the FDA’s approval of the 
device); Riley, 625 F. Supp. at 787 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding that plaintiff’s breach-
of-warranty claim was preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) to the extent it was based 
on the contents of the device’s label). 
 190.  See Ali v. Allergan USA, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-115 (GBL/TRJ), 2012 WL 
3692396, at *16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2012) (holding that a claim for breach of 
express warranty would not be preempted to the extent that it is based on 
representations made by the manufacturer about the device that were not 
approved by the FDA); O’Shea v. Cordis Corp., No. 50 2006 CA 013019 AA, 2008 
WL 3139428 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2008) (“Nevertheless, it is clear that express 
warranty claims focus on the contractual bargain between the parties and the 
express representations made by one party to another.  Therefore, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty is not preempted.”); 
Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1058 (N.J. 2012) (“[T]o the extent 
the breach of express warranty claim is based on voluntary statements, i.e., 
statements not approved by the FDA or mandated by the FDA about the use or 
effectiveness of the product for on-label or off-label uses, a breach of express 
warranty claim may proceed because federal law requires any warranty statement 
to be truthful and accurate.”). 
 191.  Cornett, 48 A.3d at 1059. 
 192.  See Cline v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-4064-AT, 
2012 WL 3631320, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2012) (noting that any argument 
that a sales representative’s statements to a doctor constituted an express warranty 
stood on much weaker ground than an argument asserting that a written limited 
warranty constituted an express warranty). 
 193.  See, e.g., James v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:10-CV-2082, 2011 WL 292240, at *3 
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and misrepresentation claim withstands the implied preemption 
doctrine set forth in Buckman because the alleged fraud is being 
committed on the physicians and patients, not the FDA.194 
While courts at times have struggled to consistently apply the 
preemption doctrine expounded upon in Riegel, the number of 
claims against medical device manufacturers found to be 
preempted will likely result in a continued focus on the actions and 
representations of sales representatives.  In the limited number of 
judicial decisions analyzing whether allegations against sales 
representatives are preempted, two important themes emerge for 
guiding medical device manufacturers related to their sales 
representatives’ interactions with physicians.  First, a court is more 
likely to find that a claim against a sales representative survives 
preemption if it is based on an affirmative action by the sales 
representative, such as physically assisting or providing direction 
during a surgery.  Second, some courts may allow plaintiffs to plead 
claims that survive preemption if they are based on statements or 
promotional activities of a sales representative to a doctor 
regarding an off-label use of a device or another matter outside of 
the FDA-approved labeling. 
It seems likely that plaintiffs will continue to pursue novel 
theories against medical device sales representatives in an attempt 
to navigate through the post-Riegel legal landscape.  As the next 
section will demonstrate, however, plaintiffs’ allegations against 
medical device sales representatives can be motivated by other 
purposes in addition to trying to avoid preemption. 
IV. FRAUDULENT JOINDER AS A DEFENSE STRATEGY 
Following Riegel, there has been an increase in cases where a 
sales representative is named as an individual defendant in order to 
defeat preemption.  However, both prior and subsequent to the 
Riegel decision, plaintiffs also have named sales representatives 
 
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (holding plaintiff’s allegations that manufacturer 
committed fraud through off-label promotion not preempted); O’Shea, 2008 WL 
3139428 (finding that fraud and misrepresentation claims regarding off-label 
promotion survived preemption, but to the extent the plaintiff sought to rely on 
general representations made concerning the devices contained in approved 
labeling or brochures, such claims are preempted). 
 194.  See James, 2011 WL 292240, at *3 n.2 (“Plaintiff’s allegations that 
Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiff and her physicians are 
also distinct from a claim that Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to 
the FDA.”). 
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individually in order to prevent removal to federal court on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction.  Federal court is generally seen as 
more favorable to defendant manufacturers and, in contrast to the 
manufacturer, sales representatives are often located in the same 
state as the plaintiff.  In order to establish jurisdiction in federal 
court, out-of-state defendant manufacturers often argue that the in-
state sales representative was fraudulently joined.  This section will 
explore recent case examples where defendants have asserted 
fraudulent joinder related to a defendant sales representative.  This 
section also includes a discussion of whether sales representatives 
are considered “sellers” under state products liability law in the 
context of alleged fraudulent joinder of the sales representative.  
Where examples of medical device sales representative cases do not 
exist, analogies are drawn to the available case law in those 
jurisdictions, including cases involving pharmaceutical sales 
representatives. 
A. Fraudulent Joinder Overview 
A fraudulently joined party cannot defeat a court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.195  The burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff 
fraudulently joined a resident defendant rests on the defendant.196  
This has been described as a “heavy burden” because the defendant 
must show: 
1. there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of 
action against the resident defendant;197 or 
2. the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring 
the resident defendant into state court;198 or 
3. there is no real connection between the claims against a 
diverse defendant and those against a non-diverse 
defendant.199 
 
 195.  Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921).  
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20521, 2011 WL 
3047794, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (discussing Eleventh Circuit fraudulent 
joinder standard); see also Wilson, 257 U.S. at 97. 
 198.  Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *2; see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing Third Circuit 
fraudulent joinder standard). 
 199.  The argument that a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined 
because there is no real connection between the claims against the diverse 
defendant and the non-diverse defendant is sometimes referred to as fraudulent 
misjoinder or procedural misjoinder.  The practical implications of a court finding 
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In evaluating a defendant’s allegation that a non-diverse party has 
been fraudulently joined, the court must find joinder proper and 
remand the case back to state court if there is even a possibility that 
a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action 
against the non-diverse defendant.200  The plaintiff is merely 
required to show that he has asserted a “colorable claim” or an 
arguably “reasonable basis” that state law could hold the non-
diverse defendant liable based on the alleged facts.201  The 
possibility that the resident defendant could be liable must be 
reasonable and not theoretical.202  Whether the claims against the 
joined defendants are viable is a matter of state law.203 
Courts finding pharmaceutical and medical device sales 
representatives fraudulently joined cite three primary reasons why 
there is no possibility that plaintiff can state a claim against the 
sales representative.  First, courts examine whether the claim 
against the non-diverse sales representative was properly pled 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and the cases 
interpreting pleading standards for complaints.204  If the complaint 
 
a non-diverse defendant misjoined as opposed to fraudulently joined are the 
same—denial of the motion to remand and severance of the claims against the 
non-diverse defendant.  See, e.g., Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 
529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that if the claims asserted against the non-
diverse defendants differ enough from the claims against the diverse defendants 
such that they do not meet the joinder requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 20(a) or its state counterpart, the parties have been misjoined and 
removal is proper); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (adopting the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder); Rutherford v. Merck 
& Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 850 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (finding fraudulent misjoinder is 
an additional form of fraudulent joinder, “namely, ‘egregious’ misjoinder of 
claims that is tantamount to fraudulent joinder”); Greene v. Wyeth, 344 F. Supp. 
2d 674, 683–85 (D. Nev. 2004) (applying the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder); 
In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 673 (describing procedural misjoinder as an 
“attempt to defeat removal by joining together claims against two or more 
defendants where the presence of one would defeat removal and where in reality 
there is no sufficient factual nexus among the claims to satisfy the permissive 
joinder standard”); Lee v. Mann, 51 Va. Cir. 465 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (same); 14B 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 (3d ed. 
1998). 
 200.  See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998); 
In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 672. 
 201.  In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 675. 
 202.  See Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Great 
Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 
2002)). 
 203.  See In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 672. 
 204.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
37
Jacxsens et al.: Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1124 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
is short on factual detail related to the claims against the sales 
representative, this may be a successful way to challenge the joinder 
of the sales representative.205  Second, some jurisdictions have 
found uncontroverted affidavits or declarations from the sales 
representative sufficient to establish fraudulent joinder.206  Finally, 
federal district courts analyze whether under state law the sales 
representative owed a legal duty that could form the basis of 
plaintiff’s claim.207  Many states have adopted the learned 
intermediary doctrine, and this can act as a bar to plaintiff’s failure 
to warn claims.208 
1. Insufficient Pleading Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 
Recently, defendants have paired the doctrine of fraudulent 
joinder with motions to dismiss, asserting that plaintiffs failed to 
meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a).209  Although this tactic has not been employed in any reported 
medical device sales representative cases, it has been successfully 
applied in cases involving medical device companies as well as 
pharmaceutical sales representatives.  These cases provide 
ammunition for similar arguments in cases where a medical device 
sales representative may be fraudulently joined.  For example, in 
Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,210 the defendants successfully 
argued fraudulent joinder by asserting that plaintiffs failed to meet 
the pleading standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal.211  In 
Beavers, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Kentucky state court naming 
medical device companies DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.; DePuy, Inc.; 
Johnson & Johnson, Inc.; Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc. 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20275, 2012 
WL 1945603, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2012) (“[T]he lack of factual allegations 
regarding Orthopaedic Partners, LLC, provides no more than labels and 
conclusions insufficient to sustain viability of the legal claims.”). 
 206.  See, e.g., Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214 (N.D. Ala. 
2006); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-20611, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19848, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2004). 
 207.  See Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2004) 
(holding that pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine, the sales 
representative does not owe a legal duty to warn the patient of the risks associated 
with the device); Lizana v. Guidant Corp., No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL 
3316405, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2004). 
 208.  See Catlett, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.  
 209.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 210.  Beavers, 2012 WL 1945603, at *1. 
 211.  Id. at *2.  
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(collectively referred to as the DePuy Defendants); and 
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC.  The DePuy Defendants removed the 
case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and fraudulent joinder of 
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC.212  The DePuy Defendants moved to 
stay all state court proceedings pending transfer of the action to 
MDL 2197 (In re DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. ASR Hip Implant Products 
Liability Litigation) and the plaintiffs subsequently filed their 
motion to remand to state court.213  The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case from the Western 
District of Kentucky to the multidistrict litigation in the Northern 
District of Ohio.214 
The issue before the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio was whether the case should be remanded back to 
Kentucky state court.215  Plaintiffs argued that defendant 
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC was a Kentucky resident (like plaintiffs) 
and destroyed diversity jurisdiction because plaintiffs asserted a 
colorable claim against that defendant.216  The defendants argued 
that removal was appropriate because there was no viable claim 
against defendant Orthopaedic Partners (in other words, 
Orthopaedic Partners had been fraudulently joined).217  
Specifically, the defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to meet the 
pleading standard articulated in Twombly218 and adopted by the 
Sixth Circuit in Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of 
Cleveland, Ohio.219 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
looked to the characterization of and factual allegations against 
Defendant Orthopaedic Partners, LLC that plaintiffs’ asserted in 
their complaint.220  The court noted that the complaint referred to 
all defendants collectively and defendant Orthopaedic Partners, 
LLC was only mentioned twice throughout the eighty-nine-
paragraph complaint.221  The court found that “the allegations 
 
 212.  See id. at *1. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See id. 
 216.  Id. at *2. 
 217.  See id. 
 218.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 219.  502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 220.  See Beavers, 2012 WL 1945603, at *4. 
 221.  See id. 
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against Orthopaedic Partners, LLC . . . fall well below the threshold 
required to meet the plausibility standard required under 
Twombly . . . .  Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to distinguish between the 
DePuy Defendants’ allegedly wrongful acts and those of 
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC.”222  The court went on to find, 
“Assuming the facts as alleged against Orthopaedic Partners, LLC 
to be true, without a modicum of additional facts, Plaintiff has 
failed to establish a colorable basis for liability.”223  The court 
explained that “the lack of factual allegations regarding 
Orthopaedic Partners, LLC, provides no more than labels and 
conclusions insufficient to sustain viability of the legal claims.”224  
Thus, the court found “Orthopaedic Partners, LLC to be 
fraudulently joined.”225 
Similarly, claims involving pharmaceutical or medical device 
sales representatives may be subject to fraudulent joinder 
arguments where the factual allegations asserted against the sales 
representative are deficient.226  In In re Diet Drugs Products Liability 
Litigation,227 defendant Wyeth removed six lawsuits from Georgia 
state court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.228  Each of the 
complaints named three Georgia sales representatives of Wyeth as 
defendants.229  Wyeth argued that the Georgia sales representative 
defendants were fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction 
and should be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity of 
citizenship of the parties.230  The plaintiffs asserted claims against 
the sales representatives along with Wyeth for negligence and 
negligent/reckless misrepresentation by marketing the drugs as 
safe.231  However, the complaints did not allege that any of the 
 
 222.  Id. at *5. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  But see Stibor v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 04 C 1255, 2005 WL 1793589, at *4 
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2005) (“[P]laintiffs’ complaint plainly states a cause of 
action . . . .”). 
 227.  294 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 228.  See id. at 670. 
 229.  Id. at 671.  These cases also include allegations against two non-diverse 
Wyeth government-relations employees as well as a non-diverse phentermine 
manufacturer.  Wyeth also argued that these parties were fraudulently joined.  
Ultimately, the court found that these additional non-diverse defendants were also 
fraudulently joined.  Id. at 679. 
 230.  Id. at 672. 
 231.  Id. at 677. 
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/3
  
2013] BEYOND THE BASICS 1127 
representatives actually had contact with the patients or physicians 
or that they made specific misrepresentations.232  Further, the 
duties of the named sales representatives consisted solely of making 
visits to physicians in Georgia to discuss an entirely different drug 
than the drug plaintiffs allegedly had taken.233  The court 
concluded that “[t]he pleadings simply do not allege colorable 
claims” against the sales representatives and that the 
representatives were, therefore, fraudulently joined.234 
Beavers and In re Diet Drugs are examples of the successful use 
of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder through the lens of a Rule 8 
pleading challenge.  While the standard for fraudulent joinder is 
stringent, it may prove to be more successful if it is able to be 
paired with a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself.  
This strategy may be most useful for complaints that assert vague 
claims against non-diverse defendants or complaints that lump all 
the defendants together and merely assert collective claims without 
specifying the involvement of the non-diverse defendant. 
2. Sales Representative’s Affidavit Provides Facts Showing Claims 
Impossible Under Applicable State Law 
In cases alleging claims against sales representatives 
individually, a common strategy is to submit a declaration or 
affidavit235 from the sales representative to provide facts showing 
the claims are impossible under applicable state law and the sales 
representative is, thus, fraudulently joined.  In fact, some 
jurisdictions have found uncontroverted affidavits sufficient to 
establish fraudulent joinder.236  While defendants are generally 
 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id.  Only one out of six of the plaintiffs ingested a drug that the sales 
representatives marketed.  See id. 
 234.  Id.; see also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 282 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding “plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant sales 
representatives failed to warn the particular physicians who prescribed the drug 
for them” and “plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations” were not sufficient to support 
their claims for failure to warn). 
 235.  The terms “declaration” and “affidavit” are used interchangeably in this 
article. 
 236.  See, e.g., Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 
JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617, at *10 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009); Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 
471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214 (N.D. Ala. 2006); Faison v. Wyeth, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 
1273, 1278 (S.D. Ga. 2004); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-20611, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19848, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2004); In re Rezulin, 133 F. 
Supp. 2d at 281. 
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prohibited from going outside the pleadings when moving for 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), defendants 
are permitted to include information outside the complaint when 
responding to a motion to remand.237  The proceeding for 
resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is more closely related to 
the procedure used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b): “[T]he 
determination of whether a resident defendant has been 
fraudulently joined must be based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings at 
the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and deposition 
transcripts submitted by the parties.”238 
In Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,239 the plaintiff, an 
Alabama resident, filed his complaint in Alabama state court 
against out-of-state hip manufacturers, DePuy and its parent 
company, Johnson & Johnson.  The plaintiff also named a DePuy 
medical device sales representative, who was an Alabama 
resident.240  The plaintiff alleged his hip implant caused him 
damage because of DePuy’s conduct in connection with the 
development, testing, manufacture, distribution, and sale of the 
hip implant.241  The defendants removed the case to the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction.242  The defendants then filed a motion to stay 
proceedings pending transfer to multidistrict litigation.243  The 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred this case to the 
Northern District of Ohio for consolidated proceedings.244  The 
plaintiff filed a motion to remand arguing that the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio lacked subject matter 
 
 237.  See, e.g., Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 
Baeza v. Tibbetts, No. 06-0407 MV/WPL, 2006 WL 2863486, at *3 (D.N.M. July 7, 
2006) (“Although the court’s inquiry bears some resemblance to that of a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the scope of the inquiry is different, and the 
court may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether the joinder is 
fraudulent.”). 
 238.  Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also Dacosta v. Novartis AG, No. CV 01-800-
BR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21313, at *34 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2002) (finding the sales 
representative was a “sham defendant” who had been fraudulently joined after 
reviewing the sales representative’s affidavit and facts developed during 
jurisdictional discovery). 
 239.  No. 1:11 dp 20521, 2011 WL 3047794, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011). 
 240.  See id. 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  See id. 
 243.  See id. 
 244.  See id. 
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jurisdiction because the defendants failed to prove fraudulent 
joinder of the sales representative.245  The defendants opposed the 
motion to remand and submitted the resident sales representative’s 
declaration in support.246 
The court held that the sales representative was fraudulently 
joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction and denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand.247  As to plaintiff’s claims for negligent or 
defective design, the court found that a claim against the sales 
representative was not possible because the sales representative 
submitted a declaration stating that he was without knowledge of 
and has never been personally involved with the design of the 
device.248  Specifically, the court found: 
Plaintiff has not shown that the resident defendant had a 
duty to warn the Plaintiff, nor has he produced evidence 
to overcome the resident defendant’s testimony that he 
has no knowledge of or involvement in the design of the 
product.  As a result, there is no possibility that Plaintiff 
could establish a cause of action for negligence against 
the resident defendant in an Alabama state court.249 
Similarly, the court found there was no possibility that plaintiff 
could establish causes of action for products liability under the 
Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine,250 breach of 
express and implied warranties, or misrepresentation and 
fraudulent concealment against the sales representative.251 
The strategy of providing an affidavit or declaration from the 
sales representative in order to prove the sales representative has 
been fraudulently joined essentially shifts the burden onto the 
plaintiff to provide factual evidence in support of the claims.  As 
the Patterson court found, it is the plaintiff’s burden to produce 
evidence “to overcome the resident defendant’s testimony.”252  
 
 245.  See id. 
 246.  See id. 
 247.  See id. at *2. 
 248.  Id. at *3–4.  
 249.  Id. at *4. 
 250.  ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess. and 1st 
Special Sess.); see also Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976) 
(articulating the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine); Casrell v. 
Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976). 
 251.  Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *6–9. 
 252.  Id. at *4.  Patterson is one of many related actions contained in the 
multidistrict litigation entitled In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 1:10 md 2197, MDL 2197.  See Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *1 n.1.  
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Indeed, ignoring a defendant’s affidavit has been found to be legal 
error and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.253 
In addition to affidavits provided by the sales representative, 
an affidavit or testimony from the treating physician may be useful 
to prove there is no colorable claim against the sales representative.  
For example, in a case alleging failure to warn, the physician’s 
affidavit might state that even if the warning had been given to the 
physician by the sales representative just as the plaintiff claims it 
should have been, the warning would not have been material to the 
physician, and the physician would not have changed the manner 
in which the physician provided advice, care, and treatment to the 
patient.254  A physician’s affidavit could also state that the physician 
independently decided to use the device and did not rely on any 
information provided by the sales representative.255  In this context, 
the physician’s affidavit is submitted on behalf of the sales 
representative in order to break the chain of proximate cause and 
show that under applicable state law, there is no possibility that the 
plaintiff has a cognizable claim against the non-diverse sales 
representative. 
3. Sales Representative Has No Legal Duty to Warn Pursuant to the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Another commonly cited argument to support fraudulent 
joinder of a sales representative is the learned intermediary 
doctrine.  The learned intermediary doctrine holds that any duty to 
warn exists only between the manufacturer of the device and the 
 
Indeed, the same result—finding a non-diverse sales representative defendant has 
been fraudulently joined based, in part, on the uncontroverted affidavit of the 
sales representative—has been reached in several other cases in that litigation.  See, 
e.g., Harper v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20522, 2011 WL 3049082 
(N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (applying Alabama law and finding non-diverse sales 
representative defendant fraudulently joined); Taylor v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 
No. 1:22 dp 20523, 2011 WL 3055295 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (same); Slay v. 
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20524, 2011 WL 3052531 (N.D. Ohio July 
25, 2011) (same); Milner v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 3:11 dp 20529, 2011 
WL 3102320 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (same). 
 253.  See Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In the case at 
bar, the Defendants submitted sworn affidavits that were undisputed and, in such a 
case, a court cannot resolve the question of fraudulent joinder by refusing to 
consider the defendants’ submissions.”). 
 254.  See, e.g., Bloodsworth v. Smith & Nephew, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1252 
(M.D. Ala. 2006).   
 255.  See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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plaintiff’s prescribing physician or surgeon.256  Under this doctrine, 
no duty exists between the plaintiff and the sales representative.257 
Lizana v. Guidant Corp.258 is an example of a court applying the 
learned intermediary doctrine to find a medical device sales 
representative owed no legal duty to plaintiff.  In Lizana, the 
plaintiffs moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi to remand their case to the Circuit Court of Harrison 
County, Mississippi.259  The plaintiffs alleged that plaintiff Howard 
Lizana collapsed at work due to a malfunctioning pacemaker 
manufactured by Guidant Corporation.260  Plaintiffs sued both 
Guidant Corporation as well as the Guidant representative who 
performed routine checks on Mr. Lizana’s pacemaker.261  The 
plaintiffs specifically asserted that the medical device representative 
(1) did not inform them that the pacemaker was subject to a recall, 
(2) participated in the initial implant surgery, and (3) assured 
plaintiffs that the pacemaker was functioning “perfectly.”262  The 
defendants argued that removal was proper because the sales 
representative’s citizenship should be disregarded because he was 
fraudulently joined.263  The court concluded that the sales 
representative could not be liable for any alleged failure to warn 
nor was there any basis for the strict liability claims asserted against 
him.264  The court reasoned, in part, that under Mississippi law, the 
learned intermediary doctrine applies to all medical devices, and 
sales representatives are under no obligation to warn patients about 
the device.265  Thus, the medical device sales representative in the 
case could not be liable for any alleged failure to warn.266 
 
 256.  See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *4; Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. 
Supp. 2d 1374, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (arguing that pursuant to the learned 
intermediary doctrine, the sales representative does not owe a legal duty to warn 
the patient of the risks associated with the device).  But see, e.g., Salazar v. Merck & 
Co., No. 05-445, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 27776 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2005). 
 257.  See Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *4. 
 258.  No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL 3316405, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 
2004). 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id.  
 263.  Id. at *2. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  See id.  
 266.  See id.; see also Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20521, 
2011 WL 3047794, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011) (applying the learned 
intermediary doctrine in the fraudulent joinder context and finding that, under 
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B. Medical Device Sales Representatives as “Sellers” Under State Products 
Liability Law 
The question of whether a sales representative qualifies as a 
“seller” under state products liability law has recently arisen in 
medical device cases in the context of fraudulent joinder.  If the 
sales representative is considered a seller under the state products 
liability statute, the sales representative could be held strictly liable 
for device defects, such that a colorable claim against the sales 
representative exists and the sales representative would not be 
fraudulently joined.  Because the determination of whether a sales 
representative qualifies as a “seller” under state products liability 
law necessarily turns on the statutory interpretation of state law, 
there has been a wide range of outcomes, with some states finding 
sales representatives are unequivocally not sellers and other states 
finding sales representatives could possibly be sellers such that 
joinder was not fraudulent.267 
 
Alabama law, the sales representative did not owe a duty to the patient and could 
not possibly be liable for negligent failure to warn).  But see Gibbs v. I-Flow, Inc., 
No. 1:08-cv-708-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 482285, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2009) 
(“[A]pplication of the [learned intermediary] doctrine is fact-sensitive, and there 
are too many uncertainties to be able to reasonably conclude that [defendant] will 
prevail on such a defense.”). 
 267.  See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *3 (citing Bloodsworth v. Smith & 
Nephew, No. Civ.A. 2:05CV622-D, 2005 WL 3470337, at *21 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 
2005)) (applying Alabama law and finding sales representatives are not sellers); 
Rundle v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00634-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL 
3022569 (D. Nev. July 6, 2011) (applying Nevada law and finding it possible that a 
sales representative could be strictly liable); Askew v. DC Medical, LLC, No. 1:11-
cv-1245-WSD, 2011 WL 1811433 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2011) (applying Georgia law 
and finding sales representatives are not sellers); Lizana, 2004 WL 3316405 (same 
applying Mississippi law); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Water Serv. Inc., 758 
S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that a sales representative is not subject to strict 
products liability under Tennessee law); see also McCarty v. Johnson & Johnson, 
No. 1:10-CV-00350 OWW-DLB, 2010 WL 2629913 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) 
(applying California law and finding sales representatives may be sellers); Gibbs, 
2009 WL 482285 (same applying Indiana law); Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, 
Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009) (same 
applying New Mexico law); Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL 
1189826 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2005) (same applying Texas law); Bittler v. White & 
Co., Inc., 560 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ill. App. 1990) (applying Illinois law and limiting 
sales representative strict liability to cases where there is a “‘participatory 
connection’ with the allegedly defective product”); Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152 
A.D.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (applying New York law and limiting sales 
agent strict products liability to cases where the sales agent is a “mandatory link in 
[the] distributive chain”). 
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/3
  
2013] BEYOND THE BASICS 1133 
1. States Finding Sales Representatives Are Not “Sellers” 
Courts applying Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee 
law have found that under the respective state products liability 
statutes, sales representatives do not qualify as “sellers.”268  Thus, if a 
plaintiff asserts a strict liability claim against a salesperson on the 
grounds that the salesperson is a “seller” in the chain of 
distribution of the product in one of these states, no colorable 
claim against the sales representative exists, such that a fraudulent 
joinder argument would be successful. 
In a case involving a medical device sales representative, the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, applying 
Alabama law, found that the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s 
Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) does not include a sales representative 
within the definition of “seller” or “manufacturer.”269  The court 
cited the reasoning from the U.S. District Courts for the Southern 
District of New York and the District of Minnesota in In re Rezulin 
Products Liability Litigation270 and In re Baycol Products Liability 
Litigation,271 respectively, applying Alabama law, as persuasive.272  In 
Rezulin, the court found that “holding a sales representative liable 
under the AEMLD would contravene the doctrine’s scope and 
purpose,” and the “sales representative was merely an agent of the 
manufacturer/seller, and, as a ‘corporate employee,’ he was not 
‘the one best able to prevent sales of defective drugs.’”273  Similarly, 
the court in Baycol reached the same conclusion, finding “the 
purpose of the AEMLD did not support a claim against a sales 
agent who ‘had no authority to compel or prevent the distribution 
 
 268.  See, e.g., Patterson, 2011 WL 3047794, at *3 (holding that a sales 
representative is not subject to strict products liability under Alabama law) (citing 
Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *21); Askew, 2011 WL 1811433 (same applying 
Georgia law); Lizana, 2004 WL 3316405 (same applying Mississippi law); Memphis 
Bank & Trust, 758 S.W.2d 525 (same applying Tennessee law). 
 269.  See Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *5 (“A defendant is liable under the 
AEMLD if the plaintiff shows the following: ‘(1) [that] he suffered injury or 
damages to himself . . . by one who sold a product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if (a) 
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is 
expected to, and did, reach the user or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it was sold.’” (quoting Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 
2d 134, 141 (Ala. 1976))). 
 270.  133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 271.  M.D.L. No. 1431 (MJD), at *4–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2004) (order 
denying motion to remand). 
 272.  See Bloodsworth, 2005 WL 3470337, at *6. 
 273.  See id. (quoting In re Rezulin Prods., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88). 
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of particular products.’”274  The U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama also cited the Supreme Court of Alabama, 
finding that the court had “rejected the theory that a retailer who 
lacks knowledge of a product’s dangerous defect can be liable 
under the AEMLD simply for ‘the mere selling of a defective 
product.’”275  Synthesizing these cases, the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Alabama found there was no reasonable 
possibility that an Alabama court would find the medical device 
sales representative liable under the AEMLD.276 
In some states, a straightforward interpretation of the state 
products liability statutes provides clear guidance on whether a 
salesperson can be held strictly liable under state law.277  Courts 
applying Mississippi law have held that medical device sales 
representatives are not considered sellers and therefore are not 
subject to strict liability for product defects.278  Similarly, courts 
applying Georgia law have found that medical device sales 
representatives do not meet the definition of “sellers” under 
Georgia law and cannot be found strictly liable for product 
defects.279  Both Mississippi and Georgia have explicit statutory 
provisions regarding who is and who is not considered a seller 
under state law.280  For example, Mississippi law provides that a 
seller other than the manufacturer will not be liable unless certain 
requirements are met: 
[T]he seller of a product other than the manufacturer 
shall not be liable unless the seller exercised substantial 
control over that aspect of the design, testing, 
manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that 
 
 274.  See id. at *6 (quoting In re Baycol Prods., M.D.L. No. 1431 (MJD), at *4). 
 275.  See id. at *7 (quoting Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 139 
(Ala. 1976)). 
 276.  See id. 
 277.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 278.  See, e.g., Lizana v. Guidant Corp., No. Civ.A 1:03CV254GRO, 2004 WL 
3316405, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 2004) (applying Mississippi law). 
 279.  See, e.g., Askew v. DC Medical, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-1245-WSD, 2011 WL 
1811433 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2011) (holding that Depuy’s sole distributor of the 
ASR hip device in Georgia was fraudulently joined because Georgia’s strict 
products liability statute imposes liability only on the manufacturer of a product 
and a seller or distributor is not strictly liable); see also Davenport v. Cummins Ala., 
Inc., 644 S.E.2d 503, 507–08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing several Georgia decisions 
and discussing the definition of a “seller” under Georgia law). 
 280.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (Westlaw); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-
63(h) (Westlaw). 
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caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; 
or the seller altered or modified the product, and the 
alteration or modification was a substantial factor in 
causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; 
or the seller had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
defective condition of the product at the time he supplied 
the product.  It is the intent of this section to immunize 
innocent sellers who are not actively negligent, but 
instead are mere conduits of a product.281 
The legal definition of a “seller” under Georgia law encompasses 
sales representatives: 
[A] person who, in the course of a business conducted for 
the purpose leases or sells and distributes; installs; 
prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles 
pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, 
specifications, or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or 
otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of 
commerce.282 
However, Georgia’s Products Liability Act also explicitly provides 
that “[f]or purposes of a product liability action based in whole or 
in part on the doctrine of strict liability in tort, a product seller is 
not a manufacturer as provided in Code Section 51-1-11 and is not 
liable as such.”283 
Although Tennessee courts have not specifically addressed 
whether a medical device sales representative would be defined as a 
“seller” under the Tennessee Products Liability Act (TPLA), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court evaluated whether a general product 
sales representative could be subject to strict products liability in 
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Water Services, Inc.284  By analogy, this 
case could be persuasive in Tennessee courts evaluating whether a 
medical device sales representative qualifies as a seller under TPLA 
and is, thus, instructive.  In Memphis Bank, the owner of a large 
commercial bank building brought a products liability action 
against a corporation operating a commercial and industrial water 
treatment business as well as the corporation’s sales 
representative.285  Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty, negligence, 
and strict liability in tort for damage to the building’s windows and 
 
 281.  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Westlaw). 
 282.  GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (Westlaw). 
 283.  Id. § 51-1-11.1(b); see also id. § 51-1-11. 
 284.  758 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1988). 
 285.  Id. at 525. 
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aluminum siding, which had become discolored by water 
containing chemicals from the building’s air conditioning system.286  
After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed all of the claims.287  The 
Tennessee Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the judgment of 
the trial court and rendered judgment for the plaintiff against both 
the corporation and the individual sales representative on the 
theory of strict liability, assessing the sales representative with a 
personal judgment of $78,808.288  The Tennessee Supreme Court, 
however, found that the sales representative was not a “seller” or 
“manufacturer” of a product as defined by TPLA.289  The court 
pointed to evidence in the record that the sales representative was 
paid a commission on all sales, was not a stockholder, a director, or 
an officer of the corporation, and the products he sold did not 
belong to him.290  Thus, defendants arguing a sales representative 
has been fraudulently joined in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, or 
Tennessee, will likely be successful in asserting that the plaintiff 
cannot state a claim for strict products liability as to the 
salesperson. 
2. States Finding Sales Representatives May Be “Sellers” 
While a few states have clear guidance on whether a 
salesperson may be subject to strict products liability claims, the 
vast majority of states have not definitively answered this 
question.291  Illinois and New York have answered the question in 
the affirmative, but have placed specific limitations on claims 
 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 525–26. 
 289.  Id. at 526; see also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-28-102(4), (7) (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.) (defining “manufacturer” as “the designer, fabricator, 
producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component 
parts” and “seller” as “a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and . . . any individual 
or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for 
resale, or for use or consumption”). 
 290.  Memphis Bank & Trust, 758 S.W.2d at 526. 
 291.  See, e.g., Rundle v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00634-PMP-
GWF, 2011 WL 3022569, at *7–13 (D. Nev. July 6, 2011) (applying Nevada law); 
McCarty v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:10-CV-00350 OWW-DLB, 2010 WL 2629913, 
at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (applying California law); Gibbs v. I-Flow, Inc., 
No. 1:08-cv-708-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 482285, at *3–4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2009) 
(applying Indiana law); Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 
JCH/LAM, 2009 WL 382617, at *5–8 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009) (applying New Mexico 
law); Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL 1189826, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Tex. May 19, 2005) (applying Texas law). 
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against sales representatives.292  In these jurisdictions, defendants 
will likely be less successful arguing that the sales representative has 
been fraudulently joined where the plaintiff claims strict liability 
against the sales representative as a seller of the product because 
these states have found that there is a “possibility” that a claim 
could be sustained under applicable state law. 
The majority of courts that have evaluated the issue under the 
applicable state law, including Nevada, California, Indiana, New 
Mexico, and Texas law, have found that while the issue has not 
been definitively decided by the state’s highest court, in a 
fraudulent joinder analysis it is possible that plaintiff could state a 
claim for strict products liability against a pharmaceutical or 
medical device sales representative.293  For example, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nevada found that a medical 
device sales representative may be strictly liable for design defects: 
Because it is possible that the Nevada Supreme Court will 
hold that a manufacturer’s exclusive sales representative is 
strictly liable for design defects based on the type of 
conduct alleged in this case, Precision Instruments has 
not been fraudulently joined so long as there is a causal 
nexus between its alleged conduct and Plaintiffs’ 
injuries.294 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
applying California law, found that it is possible a plaintiff could 
recover against a medical device sales representative under the 
stream of commerce theory.295  The court, in McCarty v. Johnson & 
Johnson,296 found that the medical device sales representative 
“worked for a separate sales company and attended Plaintiff’s 
surgery to assure presence of the product” and the fact that neither 
the sales representative nor his employer held title to the product 
 
 292.  See, e.g., Bitter v. White & Co., 560 N.E.2d 979, 981–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(applying Illinois law and limiting sales representative strict liability to cases where 
there is a “‘participatory connection’ with the . . . defective product”); Brumbaugh 
v. CEJJ, Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700–02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (applying New York 
law and limiting sales agent strict products liability to cases where the sales agent is 
a “mandatory link in [the] distribution chain”). 
 293.  See, e.g., Rundle, 2011 WL 3022569 (applying Nevada law); McCarty, 2010 
WL 2629913 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (applying California law); Gibbs, 2009 WL 
482285 (applying Indiana law); Spataro, 2009 WL 382617 (applying New Mexico 
law); Rape, 2005 WL 1189826 (applying Texas law). 
 294.  Rundle, 2011 WL 3022569, at *13. 
 295.  See McCarty, 2010 WL 2629913, at *5. 
 296.  Id. 
51
Jacxsens et al.: Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1138 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
was “of no moment.”  Similarly, other federal district courts in 
California have granted motions to remand products liability 
actions brought against resident independent sales representatives 
of medical device manufacturers or suppliers on the grounds that 
the sales representatives may potentially be liable under California 
strict products liability law for defectively designed products whose 
sales they facilitate.297 
Federal district courts interpreting state products liability laws 
in Indiana, New Mexico, and Texas have found that even though 
the highest court of the particular state has not determined that a 
strict products liability claim against a medical device sales 
representative is cognizable, an argument can be made that there is 
a possibility the products liability statute applies.  The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Indiana stated: “Even in the 
absence of any Indiana cases on point, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiffs can manage to make a reasonable argument in support of 
their product liability claim by applying Indiana’s rules for statutory 
construction.”298  Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Mexico explained that “[w]hile it is not entirely clear whether 
[plaintiff] could establish a strict liability cause of action against 
[the sales representative] in state court, this Court cannot conclude 
that there is no possibility of this.”299  And the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas found “[the defendant] has not 
shown that it is clear under Texas law that a sales representative of 
a manufacturer, who might be some type of independent 
contractor or retailer, and not an employee, can never be 
considered a seller as defined in § 82.001.”300 
Although neither Illinois nor New York courts have specifically 
 
 297.  See, e.g., Hinds v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:09cv0442 AWI DLB, 2009 WL 
1517893 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2009); Becraft v. Ethicon, Inc., Nos. C00-1474CRB, C00-
1493CRB, C00-1495CRB, C00-1496CRB, 2000 WL 1721056 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 
2000). 
 298.  Gibbs, 2009 WL 482285, at *3; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-77(a)(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.); McDaniel v. Synthes, Inc., No. 2:07-
CV-245RM, 2007 WL 3232186 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2007). 
 299.  Spataro v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CIV 08-0274 JCH/LAM, 2009 
WL 382617, at *8 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2009); see also Baeza v. Tibbetts, No. 06-0407 
MV/WPL, 2006 WL 2863486, at *4–5 (D.N.M. July 7, 2006) (reaching the same 
conclusion). 
 300.  Rape v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 9:04-CV-225, 2005 WL 1189826, at *3 (E.D. 
Tex. May 19, 2005); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001, 82.003 
(West, Westlaw through the end of 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess. of 82d 
Leg.).   
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analyzed whether a medical device sales representative could be 
held liable for strict products liability, decisions in other products 
liability contexts in these states demonstrate that the courts will 
likely broadly interpret application of the respective products 
liability laws to include medical device sales representatives.  This 
loose interpretation could include all individuals with a 
“participatory connection” or a “mandatory link” to the injury-
causing product.  The Illinois Appellate Court, in Bittler v. White & 
Co., Inc.,301 analyzed the issue of whether an exclusive sales 
representative company could be strictly liable under Illinois law 
for personal injuries the plaintiff claimed to have sustained during 
the course of his employment when he was struck on the head by 
the tailgate of a truck-mounted vacuum loader and cleaner.302  The 
court found that the determining factor was “whether the party in 
question has any ‘participatory connection, for personal profit or 
other benefit, with the injury-causing product and with the 
enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon 
the product.’”303  Ultimately the court found that the sales company 
had a participatory connection with the allegedly defective product 
such that it could be strictly liable.304 
The Supreme Court of New York’s Appellate Division also 
found that an exclusive sales agent may be subject to strict products 
liability where the agent is a “mandatory link” in the distribution 
chain.305  In Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc.,306 the plaintiff’s decedent was 
killed when a dumpster swung loose from a trash compactor and 
pinned him against his truck.307  Plaintiff sued the trash compactor 
manufacturer’s exclusive marketing agent claiming that the safety 
latch on the compactor was defective.308  The court analyzed 
whether the exclusive marketing agent of the trash compactor 
could be held strictly liable under New York products liability law.309  
The court found that “[l]iability is not to be imposed, however, 
upon a party whose role in placing the defective product in the 
 
 301.  560 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 302.  Id. at 980–81. 
 303.  Id. at 981 (quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 
725 (Ct. App. 1972)). 
 304.  See id. at 982. 
 305.  See Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152 A.D.2d 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).  
 306.  Id. at 70. 
 307.  See id. 
 308.  See id. 
 309.  See id. 
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stream of commerce is so peripheral to the manufacture and 
marketing of the product that it would not further these policy 
considerations.”310  The policy considerations indentified included 
whether injured consumers would be afforded a greater 
opportunity to bring an action against the responsible party, 
whether the entity is in a position to exert pressure on the 
manufacturer to improve safety of the product, and whether 
liability would ensure that the burden of injury from the product 
would be treated as a cost of production by placing liability on 
marketers.311  The court also noted that whether these potential 
litigants in the distributive chain have an opportunity to seek 
contribution or indemnification from the manufacturer is a 
factor.312  Based on these factors, the court held that the exclusive 
sales agent could be subject to strict products liability under New 
York law.313  The court reasoned that “[i]ts activities involve it so 
substantially, if not pervasively, in introducing these compactors 
into the stream of commerce that it is fair to say that it is a 
mandatory link in this distributive chain; hence, it may properly be 
held liable in strict products liability.”314 
V. RECENTLY ASSERTED DEFENSES AND ULTIMATE CASE OUTCOMES 
IN CASES INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF SALES                         
REPRESENTATIVE MISCONDUCT 
Products liability cases involving medical device sales 
representative conduct ultimately turn on the role of the 
representative in patient treatment or the use of the medical device 
during the surgery.  The American Medical Association’s Code of 
Medical Ethics provides that “[m]anufacturers of medical devices 
may facilitate their use through industry representatives who can 
play an important role in patient safety and quality of care by 
providing information about the proper use of the device or 
equipment as well as technical assistance to physicians.”315  To date, 
products liability actions involving allegations that a medical device 
 
 310.  Id. at 71. 
 311.  See id.  
 312.  See id. 
 313.  See id. at 71–72. 
 314.  Id. at 72. 
 315.  AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.047 (2007), available 
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code   
-medical-ethics/opinion8047.page. 
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sales representative acted inappropriately attempt to impose a duty 
on the sales representative, the medical device manufacturer, or 
both based simply on the representative’s presence in the 
operating or treatment room.  The question then becomes what 
the appropriate role of the medical device sales manufacturer in 
the operating or treatment room is.  While medical device sales 
representatives can be an asset to physicians and surgical teams, 
there is also potential liability for both the individual representative 
as well as the device manufacturer. 
This section explores the practical implications of an increase 
in claims involving medical device sales representatives, including 
the ultimate outcome of suits involving medical device sales 
representatives.  Each of the most commonly asserted defense 
theories in cases asserting a medical device sales representative 
owed a heightened duty of care to plaintiff are examined, 
including the learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty, 
captain of the ship doctrine, and lack of causation.  The available 
case law makes clear that the potential liability of the medical 
device sales representative is largely fact-sensitive and still under 
development. 
A. Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
As commentators and courts have noted, the “learned 
intermediary” doctrine is a defense that applies in the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in cases against drug and 
medical device manufacturers.316  Courts applying the learned 
intermediary doctrine to medical device cases have reasoned that 
when a device is available only upon prescription of a duly licensed 
physician, the warning required is not to the general public or to 
the patient, but rather to the prescribing doctor.317  Therefore, 
 
 316.  Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the learned intermediary doctrine has repeatedly been applied to medical 
devices); McPheron v. Searle Labs., Inc., 888 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The 
great weight of the authority in other jurisdictions is to the contrary [to Plaintiff’s 
assertion]; most courts have found that a medical device which must be prescribed 
and inserted by a physician falls under the learned intermediary doctrine.”); 
Philips Combs & Andrew Cooke, Modern Products Liability Law in West Virginia, 113 
W. VA. L. REV. 417, 438 (2011).  In fact, West Virginia is the only state that has 
completely rejected the learned intermediary doctrine.  See State ex rel. Johnson & 
Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 906, 914 (W. Va. 2007). 
 317.  See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Baker v. 
Danek Medical, 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 881 (N.D. Fla. 1998). 
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under the learned intermediary doctrine, the question before the 
court is whether the plaintiff established that his or her surgeon 
would not have used the device if he or she had received an 
adequate warning.318 
The rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine is set forth 
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts as follows: 
[O]nly health-care professionals are in a position to 
understand the significance of the risks involved and to 
assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given 
form of prescription-based therapy.  The duty then 
devolves on the health-care provider to supply to the 
patient such information as is deemed appropriate under 
the circumstances so that the patient can make an 
informed choice as to therapy.319 
The reasoning behind the learned intermediary doctrine is 
perhaps even more persuasive when medical devices—rather than 
prescription drugs—are involved because it is not reasonably 
conceivable that an individual could implant a device that requires 
a trained surgeon and “it is highly likely a patient and doctor spend 
considerably more time discussing the risks and benefits of a 
surgically implanted device than they would discussing the risks 
and benefits of routinely prescribed prescription drugs.”320 
Although the learned intermediary doctrine has traditionally 
been applied to the warnings a manufacturer has provided in 
product labeling and package inserts, it also is equally applicable to 
the warnings that sales representatives provide.321  As one court in a 
jurisdiction that has adopted the learned intermediary doctrine has 
stated “any duty to warn exists only between the manufacturer and 
the plaintiff’s surgeon, not between the plaintiff and the sales 
representative.”322  Thus, claims alleging that a sales representative 
failed to adequately warn a plaintiff about a device’s risks have 
 
 318.  Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 483 F. App’x 909, 912 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 319.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) & cmt. b (1998). 
 320.  See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 321.  For examples of cases applying the learned intermediary doctrine to 
allegations involving the conduct of a medical device manufacturer’s sales 
representatives, see Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 
1286–87 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Beale, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1366–78; O’Connell v. Biomet, 
Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1281–82 (Colo. App. 2010); Kennedy v. Medtronic, Inc., 851 
N.E.2d 778, 784–86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 322.  Patterson v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11-dp-20521, 2011 WL 
3047794, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2011). 
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generally failed.323 
Some courts have recognized that a dispositive motion based 
on the learned intermediary defense may be defeated if there is an 
issue of fact related to a sales representative’s actions or 
representations.  However, the learned intermediary defense may 
still be successful subsequently at trial.  For example, in Hurley v. 
Heart Physicians, P.C., the plaintiff admitted that the warning 
provided by a pacemaker manufacturer in its technical manual was 
adequate, but asserted that advice given by a sales representative to 
the physician contradicted the manual and nullified the warnings 
contained in the technical manual.324  Specifically, a pacemaker 
sales representative was asked by the plaintiff’s cardiologist to 
attend an examination of the plaintiff “to test the battery in her 
pacemaker” and “to make adjustments” as needed.325  At the 
examination of the plaintiff, the sales representative found that the 
battery was low and needed to be replaced as soon as possible.326  
The plaintiff’s mother refused to consent to the replacement and 
insisted that the plaintiff no longer required the pacemaker.327  The 
physician asked the sales representative for options to determine 
whether the plaintiff required the pacemaker.328  The sales 
representative stated that one option was downward adjustment to 
the rate of the pacemaker, which would also conserve battery life.329  
The physician decided to adjust the rate downwards.330  The 
plaintiff subsequently suffered a cardiac event and resulting brain 
damage.331 
The trial court granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion 
for summary judgment based on the learned intermediary 
doctrine.332  However, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court, finding that a material question of fact existed as to 
whether “the warnings given by the . . . representative were 
consistent with the manual and, therefore, the trial court 
improperly determined that the defendant was entitled to prevail 
 
 323.  See, e.g., id.; Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87; O’Connell, 250 P.3d 
at 1281–82. 
 324.  898 A.2d 777 (Conn. 2006). 
 325.  Id. at 780.  
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. at 781. 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. at 782. 
57
Jacxsens et al.: Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of Liability and Defenses f
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1144 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
under the learned intermediary doctrine as a matter of law.”333  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court focused on the presence and 
involvement of the representative with the adjustment to plaintiff’s 
pacemaker: 
What is at issue . . . is whether, notwithstanding the FDA 
approved written pacemaker replacement warnings, [the 
representative], by his oral communications to [the 
cardiologist] that turning down the pacemaker was an 
option, accompanied by his physical adjustment of the 
pacemaker . . . actually contradicted the manual, thereby 
vitiating and nullifying the manual’s warnings . . . .334 
Because the Connecticut Supreme Court found that this was a 
question of fact, the case was remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings.335  The trial was limited to the issue of whether 
the representative’s oral statements and adjustment of the 
pacemaker were for “diagnostic” purposes or whether they “actually 
contradicted” the technical manual and therefore nullified the 
accompanying warnings.336  The case was tried before a jury and, 
after a twenty-six day trial, a defense verdict was returned.337  The 
jury specifically found that the sales representative’s actions did not 
nullify the written warnings.338  The plaintiff appealed to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, but the verdict was upheld on 
appeal.339  Thus, although the trial court opened the door to sales 
representative liability even where a learned intermediary defense 
was proffered, the defense ultimately prevailed at trial. 
Moreover, a few courts have recognized an “overpromotion” 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine that is largely 
dependent on the conduct of a manufacturer’s sales 
representatives.  Under this exception, which has typically been 
applied in the prescription drug context, a few courts have called 
into question the application of the learned intermediary doctrine 
where drug salesmen encouraged physicians to prescribe a drug by 
providing information that contradicted the warnings, thus 
allegedly influencing a physician to prescribe a drug more freely 
 
 333.  Id. at 779. 
 334.  Id. at 786–87. 
 335.  Id. at 789. 
 336.  See Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 3 A.3d 892, 899–900 (Conn. 2010). 
 337.  See id. at 898–99. 
 338.  See id. 
 339.  Id. at 896, 912. 
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than the physician otherwise would.340  However, in Beale v. Biomet, 
Inc., the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a device 
manufacturer’s overpromotion of a knee implant created an 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.341  There, the court 
ruled that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that the 
manufacturer’s sales representatives influenced the implanting 
doctor to inappropriately select patients for the device; thus, the 
learned intermediary doctrine shielded the manufacturer from 
liability.342 
B. Absence of Duty 
Several courts have been unwilling to find that a sales 
representative’s presence in an operating room during the 
implantation of a medical device creates an additional duty to 
provide certain advice or warnings to a physician.343  For example, 
in Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc., the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s attempt to impose an affirmative duty on a sales 
representative present during the implantation of a pain pump.344  
The plaintiff’s negligence action against the sales representative 
“alleged breach of the duty to use reasonable care in the 
instruction and education of physicians.”345  The court found that 
even if the sales representative did have some interaction with the 
surgeon during the surgery, he did not have a duty to affirmatively 
tell the doctor while he was performing the surgery how to use the 
device.346  The court, therefore, granted the sales representative’s 
motion for summary judgment, reasoning: 
The undisputed facts show that [the sales representative] 
did not participate in the decision-making during [the] 
procedure.  [His] role was limited to carrying “back up” 
products in their sterile packages to have available for the 
 
 340.  See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 
183 (Ct. App. 1964); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971); Baldino v. 
Castagna, 454 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), rev’d, 478 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1984). 
 341.  492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377–78 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92 
(M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011); Kennedy v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 851 N.E.2d 778, 786–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 344.  Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92. 
 345.  Id. at 1279. 
 346.  Id. at 1291. 
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surgeon’s use, if necessary, and to observe preparation            
of the products.  [He] did not “scrub in” for the 
procedure . . . and did not enter the sterile field. . . .  [The 
surgeon] testified that the decisions made while he 
performed surgery were his own decisions.347 
Another example of a plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to 
impose an affirmative duty on a sales representative is evident in 
Kennedy v. Medtronic.348  In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the 
manufacturer of a pacemaker and its leads owed the patient “a duty 
to refrain from providing a pacemaker . . . and participating in the 
[surgery] once [the representative] discovered the procedure was 
being performed in a setting that was not part of a hospital.”349  The 
plaintiff alternatively pled that the manufacturer had voluntarily 
assumed a duty of care for the decedent by sending a 
representative to the surgery.350  The pacemaker manufacturer’s 
clinical specialist was present at the surgery “to provide technical 
support and ensure that the [pacemaker’s] lead parameters were 
correctly calibrated and the lead was functioning properly.”351 
In affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment 
for the manufacturer, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that the sales representative voluntarily undertook a duty outside of 
the limited role he had agreed to perform, which was to ensure the 
leads were properly calibrated.352  The court also held that no duty 
of care existed for the manufacturer because the plaintiff’s injuries 
were not reasonably foreseeable and the burden and consequences 
of imposing a duty on the manufacturer would be “substantial,” as 
it “would be a significant burden to require [the manufacturer] to 
monitor the conditions under which a doctor performs surgery.”353  
The court opined: 
It would be unreasonable, and potentially harmful, to 
require a clinical specialist . . . to delay or prevent a 
medical procedure simply because she believes the setting 
is not appropriate or the doctor is unqualified.  To hold 
otherwise would place a medical device manufacturer . . . 
 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Kennedy, 851 N.E.2d at 778. 
 349.  Id. at 785. 
 350.  Id. at 786.  
 351.  Id. at 787. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Id. at 786. 
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in the middle of the doctor-patient relationship.354 
Similarly, in rejecting a plaintiff’s attempt to impose an 
affirmative duty to prevent a doctor’s misuse of the company’s 
products, another court recognized “[i]t is both impractical and 
unrealistic to expect . . . manufacturers to police individual 
operating rooms to determine which doctors adequately supervise 
their surgical teams.”355 
A small handful of courts, however, have imposed a duty on a 
sales representative when the representative is present during a 
surgical procedure and assisting with some aspect of the surgery.  
For example, in Zappola v. Leibinger the court held that the written 
instructions for a device to close a cranial bone flap did not satisfy 
the manufacturer’s duty under the learned intermediary doctrine 
where the medical device sales representative recommended the 
product to the physician without conveying certain 
recommendations contained in the device’s instructions.356  In 
Zappola, the defendant sales representative was present at the 
plaintiff’s surgery to remove a brain tumor.357  Based on the size 
and location of the tumor, the plaintiff’s surgeon decided he could 
not use the representative’s medical device to reattach the 
plaintiff’s bone flap as planned.358  The surgeon specifically asked 
the sales representative “to observe the size of the cranial defect in 
[the plaintiff’s] skull.”359  The surgeon and the sales representative 
then discussed possible methods of closing the skull, and, during 
this conversation, the representative suggested another of the 
manufacturer’s products.360  When the surgeon expressed concern 
about using the device based on his past experience, the sales 
representative told the surgeon that the device “had been 
improved.”361  The surgeon used the product, which ultimately 
fragmented, causing the plaintiff a cerebrospinal fluid leak and 
four additional surgeries.362 
 
 
 354.  Id.  
 355.  Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(pharmaceutical case). 
 356.  Nos. 86038, 86102, 2006 WL 1174448, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 2006). 
 357.  Id. at *2. 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. at *3. 
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The defendant manufacturer argued that it satisfied its duty to 
warn the surgeon because the written warnings that accompanied 
the product provided instructions and guidance regarding closing 
a cranial defect like the plaintiff’s defect.363  The court disagreed 
and found that the key factor was that the sales representative was 
present in the operating room and observed the plaintiff’s 
condition: 
Although the written instructions [provided 
recommendations for use], [the sales representative] did 
not make these recommendations to the doctor.  Despite 
the fact that he was professionally obligated to inform 
[the surgeon] about the use of the product and personally 
observed the size of [the plaintiff’s] cranial defect, [the 
sales representative] did not uphold his duty of ensuring 
that the product was used properly.364 
In essence, the court in Zappola imposed a duty on the 
defendant sales representative to inform the surgeon about the 
uses of the product, in part because the representative affirmatively 
recommended the product after observing the plaintiff’s cranial 
defect.365  The case was tried and a jury found the plaintiff’s 
surgeon, the medical device manufacturer, and the sales 
representative liable for negligence.366 
Under similar circumstances, the court in Chamian v. Sharplan 
Lasers, Inc. found that the manufacturer “provided a technician to 
assist in the surgery, and, by doing so, assumed a duty to [the 
plaintiff] to ensure that the technician . . . was knowledgeable 
about the equipment and competent to provide technical 
assistance to physicians using the equipment.”367  The defendant 
manufacturer’s technician was present during plaintiff’s plastic 
surgery to test the device, make sure that it was working properly, 
and assist the physician by entering and adjusting settings as 
directed by the surgeon.368  During the surgery, the physician asked 
the representative to recommend appropriate settings for the 
device, which the representative provided.369 
 
 363.  Id. at *6. 
 364.  Id. at *6. 
 365.  See id. at *6. 
 366.  See id. at *1. 
 367.  No. 200000171, 2004 WL 2341569, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 
2004). 
 368.  See id. at *3. 
 369.  See id. at *5. 
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In both Zappola and Chamian, the courts appeared to place 
great significance on the fact that the physician consulted with the 
sales representative during surgery regarding medical decisions 
relating to the device at issue.  The presence of the sales 
representative in the operating room was also a major factor.  
However, as the next section will show, other courts have taken a 
different view, finding that physicians are the “captain of their ship” 
and thus responsible for all medical decisions that they make. 
C. Captain of the Ship Doctrine 
The captain of the ship doctrine relies on many of the same 
justifications as the learned intermediary doctrine and provides 
that a “licensed physician is the principal or master while 
performing medical services within a hospital.”370  On the other 
hand, hospital personnel assisting under the surgeon’s control are 
borrowed servants, and thus, the surgeon is liable for their 
negligence once he or she assumes control in the operating 
room.371  An example of application of the captain of the ship 
doctrine to medical device sales representatives is evident in 
O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., where the Colorado Court of Appeals 
upheld the trial court’s decision that a sales representative present 
during a surgical procedure was an agent of a doctor, who was the 
“captain of the ship” and in control of the surgery.372  The court 
described the roles of the surgeon and the sales representative: 
The sole purpose of [the sales representative] being in the 
operating room was to provide [the surgeon] with 
information about the [device], which information [the 
surgeon] then used to make his medical judgments.  That 
is, [the surgeon] remained in control of the surgery vis-à-
vis [the sales representative] and all other non-physicians 
in the operating room.  Because [the surgeon] remained 
in control of the surgery, anything [the sales 
representative] might have done during that surgery, 
including any advice he allegedly gave or should have 
given to [the surgeon], was done as a crew member, so to 
speak, of the surgical ship.373 
Because the sales representative in this case was the doctor’s agent 
 
 370.  O’Connell v. Biomet, Inc., 250 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App. 2010). 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  Id. at 1283–84. 
 373.  Id. 
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during the surgery and the plaintiff settled his claims against the 
doctor, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 
the claims against the sales representative.374 
Courts have applied the reasoning behind the captain of the 
ship doctrine to defeat claims attacking a sales representative’s 
statements for failure to warn.375  In Hall v. Horn Medical, L.L.C., the 
plaintiff alleged that a sales representative negligently represented 
to a doctor that an intradiscal cage device could be used without 
performing a bone graft, despite the fact that the written warnings 
accompanying the device explicitly stated that the device was 
intended to be used with a bone graft.376  Plaintiff sued the surgeon 
for medical malpractice and the sales representative for negligent 
misrepresentation.377  The implanting doctor testified that he would 
not have implanted the device without a bone graft if the sales 
representative had not told him that this was an acceptable off-label 
use.378  Not surprisingly, the sales representative denied ever 
recommending the device for a use that was not only off-label, but 
affirmatively contraindicated by the written warnings.379  However, 
the court found that—even if the sales representative told the 
implanting doctor that he could use the device without a bone 
graft—any reliance by the doctor on that statement was 
unreasonable as a matter of law.380  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court reasoned “[a]s a seasoned neurosurgeon, it is patently 
unreasonable for [the implanting surgeon] to rely on a sales 
representative’s opinion about the type of procedure that should 
be employed in operating on a patient’s spine.”381 
Accordingly, because a physician is the “captain of the ship” 
when it comes to making medical decisions regarding a patient’s 
surgery, defendant manufacturers will want to argue that any 
reliance on representations made by a sales representative—who 
has neither the medical experience nor education of a physician—
about issues dealing with medical care is per se unreasonable. 
 
 374.  Id. at 1284. 
 375.  See, e.g., Hall v. Horn Med., L.L.C., No. 11-1032, 2012 WL 1752546 (E.D. 
La. May 16, 2012). 
 376.  Id. at *1–3. 
 377.  Id. at *1. 
 378.  Id. at *3. 
 379.  Id.  Promotion of off-label use is strictly prohibited by federal regulations 
and sales representatives have been prosecuted for violation.  See supra Part II. 
 380.  Hall, 2012 WL 1752546, at *3. 
 381.  Id. 
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D. Lack of Causation 
Challenging causation has also been an effective defense for 
medical device manufacturers facing claims based on the conduct 
of their sales representatives.  It is a basic principle of tort law that a 
plaintiff must show that a defendant’s actions proximately and 
actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.382  Accordingly, courts have 
been disinclined to allow claims to proceed past summary 
judgment where the plaintiff cannot show that a sales 
representative’s mere presence in an operating room was causally 
related to the injury the plaintiff suffered.383  This is especially true 
if the sales representative did not participate in the decision 
making during the procedure and if his role was primarily to 
provide technical support.384  For claims attacking instructions or 
representations that a sale representative made, the plaintiff must 
allege and show that the sales representative’s alleged negligence 
caused the plaintiff’s injuries, rather than some other cause such as 
medical malpractice or a defect in the device—the latter of which is 
often found to be preempted.385  Causation arguments have also 
been successfully asserted by defendants against allegations that 
they failed to adequately report adverse events, even if a sales 
representative is present at a surgery.386 
A defense based on causation is also available to defend 
against a failure to warn claim where the “failure of the 
manufacturer to provide the physician with an adequate warning of 
the risks associated with a prescription product is not the 
proximate cause of a patient’s injury [because] the prescribing 
 
 382.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26–28 (2010). 
 383.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1291–92 
(M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 384.  See id. at 1291 (“The undisputed facts show that [the sales rep] did not 
participate in the decision-making during [the] procedure.  [His] role was limited 
to carrying ‘back up’ products in their sterile packages to have available for the 
surgeon’s use, if necessary, and to observe preparation of the products.  [He] did 
not ‘scrub in’ for the procedure . . . and did not enter the sterile field.”). 
 385.  See Adkins v. Cytyc Corp., No. 4:07CV00053, 2008 WL 2680474, at *3 
(W.D. Va. July 3, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint because it was equally 
possible that faults in the medical device caused plaintiff’s damages rather than 
negligent instruction by the physician); see also supra Part III (discussing 
preemption in the context of medical device cases). 
 386.  Cf. Rollins v. St. Jude Med., 583 F. Supp. 2d 790, 803–04 (W.D. La. 2008) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims that defendant manufacturer failed to properly 
report adverse events unrelated to plaintiff’s surgery because plaintiff failed to 
allege how this alleged failure caused her injuries). 
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physician had independent knowledge of the risk that the adequate 
warning should have communicated.”387  In other words, “the 
causal link between a patient’s injury and the alleged failure to 
warn is broken when the prescribing physician had ‘substantially 
the same’ knowledge as an adequate warning from the 
manufacturer should have communicated to him.”388  Therefore, to 
succeed with a failure to warn claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the alleged warning that the sales representative should have 
provided concerned a matter outside of the physician’s knowledge.  
Furthermore, some courts have taken an even more expansive view 
and found that “a medical device manufacturer has no duty to warn 
physicians of a device’s dangers which the medical community 
generally appreciates.”389 
Courts have also generally recognized that plaintiffs cannot 
show causation where the physician testifies that he or she would 
have still prescribed the drug or device even with a stronger 
warning, such as when the physician never read the warning that 
accompanied a device.390  However, courts are sometimes hesitant 
to let a device manufacturer off the hook just because a physician 
did not read materials accompanying the device.  In the recent 
decision in Bonander v. Breg, the court refused to grant summary 
judgment on the plaintiff’s strict liability and failure to warn claims 
despite the fact that the doctor who inserted the pain pump in the 
plaintiff’s shoulder testified that he did not read the pain pump’s 
package insert.391  The court in Bonander ruled that there remained 
a genuine issue of fact whether warnings from, inter alia, the 
defendant’s sales representatives to the physician would have 
 
 387.  Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995); see also 
Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting 
Christopher, 53 F.3d at 1192). 
 388.  Christopher, 53 F.3d at 1192; see also Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 
1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he manufacturer cannot be said to have caused 
the injury if the doctor already knew of the medical risk.”). 
 389.  Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 723 N.E.2d 302, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999). 
 390.  See Johnson v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 02-1328 JTNFLN, 2004 WL 742038, at 
*10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2004) (finding that where the physician testified that he 
never saw the warnings that accompanied the device, causation for plaintiff’s 
failure to warn claim does not exist as a matter of law); cf. Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 
F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] product defect claim based on insufficient 
warnings cannot survive summary judgment if stronger warnings would not have 
altered the conduct of the prescribing physician.”). 
 391.  Bonander v. Breg, Inc., No. 09-2795 (JRT/JJK), 2012 WL 4128386, at *4 
(D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2012). 
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prevented the plaintiff’s injuries.392  One particularly problematic 
aspect of this opinion is that the physician testified that he did not 
rely on medical device companies to provide information regarding 
the risks and benefits of a medical device.393  In essence, this 
opinion states that if there is any chance that the implanting 
physician possibly could have heeded a different warning, then a 
plaintiff’s claims may be able to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.  Thus, while causation arguments generally may provide 
a safe-haven for medical device manufacturers faced with claims 
involving sales representative conduct, the manufacturer should be 
aware of exceptions that may exist in the applicable jurisdiction. 
In a recent medical device case involving claims against both 
the medical device manufacturer of an intrathecal neurostimulator 
and the sales representative, the defendants argued that the 
learned intermediary doctrine precluded plaintiffs’ claims, the 
defendants did not owe a duty to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs did not 
present evidence that any representations made by the sales 
representative in the operating room caused plaintiffs’ injuries.394  
Plaintiffs’ original petition alleged that “[a]s a result of the 
fraudulent and negligent acts of Defendants Medtronic, Inc. and 
[Medtronic’s representative], the Plaintiffs suffered permanent and 
irreversible injuries.”395  Specifically, the defendants “intentionally 
misrepresented the efficacy and necessity of their Medtronic 
medical device,” causing the plaintiff to undergo an unnecessary 
surgical procedure.396  The plaintiffs alleged that Medtronic’s 
representative told the plaintiffs “that he was there to make 
everything safe” and he and another representative “portrayed 
themselves as medical consultants and made recommendations” to 
the plaintiffs.397  Plaintiffs also sued the implanting physician, Peter 
Lotze.398  Medtronic and its sales representative moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ physician, Dr. Lotze, was 
responsible for all patient, clinical, medical, and surgical decisions 
 
 392.  See id. 
 393.  See id. 
 394.  See Defendants Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s Traditional & “No 
Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law at 
2–3, Howton v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 2009-47341 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 2011) 
[hereinafter Defendants’ Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion]. 
 395.  Plaintiffs’ Original Petition at 3, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (July 27, 2009). 
 396.  Id. 
 397.  Id. at 10. 
 398.  See id. at 26–27. 
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and, thus, the learned intermediary doctrine barred plaintiffs’ 
claims.399  Defendants also attacked the plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims, arguing that Medtronic and the sales representative owed 
no duty to the plaintiffs and there was no evidence establishing the 
element of causation.400 
Plaintiffs countered that the learned intermediary doctrine did 
not apply to this case because there was a direct misrepresentation 
regarding the medical device’s alleged dangerous propensities to 
the consumer.401  Plaintiffs also argued that their claims were not 
negligence claims, but were instead fraud claims.402  The case 
ultimately went to trial on the question of whether Medtronic and 
its sales representative committed fraud against the plaintiff.403  
After an approximately one-month long trial, the jury found 
Medtronic and its sales representative not liable to the plaintiffs for 
fraud.404  While the plaintiffs were able to avoid application of the 
learned intermediary doctrine, absence of duty, and causation 
defenses to their claims by couching them as fraud claims instead 
of negligence claims, this strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful at 
trial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Medical devices are becoming increasingly complex in 
technology and often require specific training or special knowledge 
or experience to be used effectively in patient treatment.  Further, 
physicians are faced with several competing options in terms of 
medical devices available for a particular patient condition.  It is 
not surprising then that medical device representatives are 
increasingly requested to attend surgeries or to offer technical 
information, support, or assistance regarding the device.  The 
 
 399.  See Defendants’ Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion, supra note 394, at 
9, 27–28 (referring to the district court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ Notice of Partial 
Nonsuit of Defendant Peter Lotze, M.D., Howton, No. 2009-47341 (Mar. 18, 2011), 
which dismissed Lotze). 
 400.  See id. at 30, 32–35. 
 401.  See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s 
Traditional & “No Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–14, Howton, 
No. 2009-47341 (Apr. 18, 2011); see also Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply to Defendants 
Medtronic, Inc. & Stuart Ison’s Reply in Support of their Traditional & “No 
Evidence” Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (Apr. 
26, 2011) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply]. 
 402.  See Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply, supra note 401, at 1. 
 403.  See Jury Charge at 3, Howton, No. 2009-47341 (June 3, 2011).  
 404.  See id. 
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increasing technical need for medical device sales representatives 
coupled with an increase in government enforcement actions and 
post-Riegel civil products liability actions involving sales 
representative conduct is rapidly changing liability issues faced by 
medical device sales representatives. 
Not only must medical device manufacturers be aware of new 
claims related to their sales representatives, but the manufacturers 
and their outside counsel must develop new defenses and defense 
strategies.  An analysis of recent relevant case law reveals several 
practical steps that a manufacturer and its counsel can take to assist 
in the defenses of these claims.  For example, coordination 
between counsel handling government enforcement actions and 
civil products liability actions is key to consistent positions and 
defenses for the manufacturer.  In addition, it is possible that 
individual sales officers or directors may have counsel or may need 
counsel separate from that of the manufacturer, with whom 
coordination will also be necessary, particularly as it relates to any 
testimony by the sales officer or director.  Depending on the 
procedural posture, products liability counsel may want to 
approach the court regarding coordination in terms of timing of 
discovery and trial with the government enforcement action.  
Further, outside products liability counsel must be prepared to 
move to exclude or limit evidence of irrelevant government 
enforcement actions in civil actions. 
At the outset of a case, counsel should examine the complaint 
to determine if removal to federal court is possible based on a 
fraudulent joinder argument as to the diversity-defeating sales 
representative.  A fraudulent joinder argument is most likely to 
succeed in cases where: (1) the complaint lacks detailed allegations 
as to the sales representative; (2) the learned intermediary 
argument is particularly strong in the applicable jurisdiction; (3) an 
affidavit from the sales representative or the prescribing physician 
establishes that there is no colorable claim against the sales 
representative; and (4) the sales representative is not considered a 
seller and could not otherwise be held liable under the applicable 
state products liability statute. 
Further, as a first line of defense in products liability actions 
involving sales representative conduct, when a PMA-approved 
device is involved, counsel should consider an early dispositive 
motion based on Riegel preemption.  Counsel should be aware of 
the most recent decisions both within the jurisdiction and outside 
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the jurisdiction and be ready to distinguish those cases finding an 
issue of fact.  Cases involving detailed allegations of actual actions 
taken or representations made by the sales representative, 
particularly in the off-label promotion context, may be more 
difficult to resolve on a preemption dispositive motion. 
Should a Riegel-preemption argument not be feasible or 
successful, manufacturers and their counsel should be prepared to 
proceed to discovery with an eye towards establishing support for 
key defenses to claims involving sales representatives: the learned 
intermediary doctrine, captain of the ship, lack of duty, and lack of 
causation.  There is no general consensus among the courts 
regarding application of the learned intermediary doctrine or the 
captain of the ship doctrine, and arguments regarding duty and 
causation fall on both sides of the liability spectrum.  Ultimately, 
each case must be examined closely based on the facts to 
determine if there is a real danger of liability based on the 
representative’s involvement in the patient’s care.  In recent years, 
there have been few sales representative cases that proceeded to 
trial, but those that have met with overall success for 
manufacturers.  Keys to success for either a dispositive motion—
based on the learned intermediary doctrine, captain of the ship, 
lack of duty, and lack of causation—or at trial, not surprisingly, 
include strong testimony at deposition by the sales representative as 
well as the prescribing physician.  Understanding the nuances of 
the applicable jurisdiction’s case law related to these defenses in 
advance of these key depositions is necessary in order to obtain the 
helpful testimony needed.  Even if a dispositive motion or trial is 
not successful, manufacturers and their counsel have been 
successful challenging the verdicts or negative decisions of the trial 
courts on appeals. 
Consequently, while the increase in government enforcement 
actions involving sales personnel and the post-Riegel environment 
have given rise to novel claims and liability concerns involving sales 
representatives, manufacturers and their counsel can defend and 
resolve these claims successfully through preparation and novel 
defense strategy approaches. 
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